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l�THODUCT!Ol'i 
This study ls an inquiry into the People's Republic of China's 
nuclear policy and its strategy in the nuclear age. In spite of 
the arms control agreements which have been achieved in recent 
years, the problem of China's role in arms control has remained 
relatively untouched. Th1s proleot is an attempt to see if a 
study of China's policy and strategy could increase the under­
standing .of this problem. 
There are basically two reasons for doing this research. The 
first is the seating of the People's Republic of China 1n the 
United States. In the author's opinion, China's emergence as a 
nuclear power means that armament or disarmament. speculatior. 
and verificat1oL, are problems for which no effective solution 
will have meaning unless China is a full partic1pat;t. \.:n1na is 
already seen by many as a great power and as s�ch will not be 
content to be represented by the Soviet union !lcting a.:- ·oroKer 
in disarmament negotiations. Furthermore, China's admission ... :. 
the united '"a tions in 1971 made the viewpoint more prevalent that 
any mult1lateral measure in the United Nations is not likely to 
come about unless the superpowers, including China, share a com­
mon interest in arms control efforts. Therefore, arms control 
in the 1970s is not only concerned with the strategic stability 
between the United States and. the Soviet Union but also with the 
task of inducing China to participate in arms control efforts. 
The second reason for doing thls research concerns t�e recent 
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agreements achieved by the United States and the Soviet Union 
in the SA LT negotiations . On May 26, 1972 , President Nixon and 
L eonid Breshnev signed a Treaty on A BMs and an �nterim A gree­
ment in Moscow. It remains to be seen whether the a greements of 
May 26 will prove to b e  more of a success than a failure in the 
attempt of inducing China to participate in arms control efforts .  
In fact ,  these agreements not only had tremendous effects on the 
nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
but they also challenged all the preconceptions of those who 
advocated a Chinese-oriented A BM system. In view of these two 
developments , the seating of the People ' s  Republic of China and 
Amer1can-sov1et arms control agreements, there is a need to 
examine Chinese nuclear policy and its impact on the world 
system of international relations. 
In analyzing Chinese nuclear pol·lcy, one basic point must be 
kept 1n  mind . A lthough China ' s  military strength seems to be 
imcomparably stronger than most nations , China has little in 
the way of nuclear weaponry by comparison with the superpowers. 
A s  a consequenc e ,  there are certainly grounds for such a view 
that China ' s  basic atti tude toward arms control i s  of necessity 
defensive. It l s  a fact that ever since 1949 China has felt 
very vulnerable to a nuclear attack by the Uni ted States or even 
the Soviet Union.· I'n Southeast Asia• China • s support of local 
Communist revolutions has brought 1t close to oontrontat1on 
with the United States. In Atrloa i t  ls competing for the loyal­
ties of the emerging nations with both the Soviet Union and the 
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W est. W i thin the Communi st camp i t  has challenged the S oviet 
Union ' s  right to be the leader of the world revolution. All 
those actions, . leading to an increased risk of nu clear attac k 
by the superpow ers, have ;made the ta sk ot defending China ' s  
national secur ity more difficult. One ot China ' s  aims has been, 
and still i s ,  to inc rease i ts national defense c apability to 
oppose the superpower ' s  nuc lear threat .  M ore ba sic i s  the tac t 
that China' s  hope i s  to increase its influ enc e in Asia and to 
deter nuclear attac� against China. 
To da te ,  the Chinese government has consistently advocated 
the complete prohibition and thorough destruc tion of nuclear 
weapons. But , in tac t ,  the Chinese government has c onsistently 
opposed all American-s oviet steps toward arms control and refused 
to accept any limitation on i ts own freedom ot action. I n  196J, 
the Chinese bitterly a tta cked the partial test-ban treaty signed 
by the United S tates, Britain, and the S oviet Union in Moscow 
and regarded i t  as a "big fraud to fool the peoples of the world." 
In 1964, when China suc cessfully exploded i ts first nuclear bomb, 
Peking made a strong "no-first use" pledge and formally proposed 
to the governments of the world that a universal summit conference 
be convened to disc uss the question of a complete prohibition 
and thorough destruc tion of nuc lear weapons. This proposal was 
primarily for purpose of propaganda , and i t  was dismissed by the 
W est because the terms used by the Chinese in their proposal did 
not allow tor prac tic al negotiations leading to specific agreea enta . 
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Although China's attitude toward all arms control measures 
sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union has so far 
been hostile, this does not mean that it is unchangeable. It 
should be remembered that China's policy in regard to arms con­
trol took shape at a time when the Sino-Soviet split was deve� 
loping. At that time, China found that its national security 
and major power status needed to be sustained by strength at 
home. The Chinese strategy was theretore based on intense hos-
til1ty towards the Soviet Union and the need for Chinese self-
reliance. 
Before t�e Sino-Soviet split, China's national security came 
primarily from the Sino-soviet alliance. Soviet official assur­
ance was reflected in Khruschev'a statement in September 1958, 
that "an attack on the People's Republic of China, which is a 
great friend, ally, and neighbor of our country, is an attack 
on the Soviet Union ••• and the Sovi.et Union would do everything 
to defend, Jointly with People's China, the security of both 
1 
countries." In the years immediately following the Sino-soviet 
split, China was actually forced to change its attitude toward 
nuclear weapons and to see the need of its own nuclear capability 
under the circumstance ot increasing tensions with the soviet 
government. Consequently, there was certainly considerable debate 
in China during 1957 and 1958 on the question ot nuclear armament. 
(1 ) . Khruschev message or September 7 ,  1958, to President Eisenhower, 
text ln New York Times, September 9 ,  1958 •. 
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The great d eba te arose from the theoretical contrad iction between 
manpower and nuclear power. Trad itionally , C ommunist Ch1ll4 ' s  
lead er s have from time to time· stressed the super iority of ma n 
to weapon. For example, in the article published in November 
1950 , after China had intervened in the Korean War, the Chinese 
argued that " the atomic bomb i tself cannot be the d ecisive 
factor in a war ••• the more extensive the opponent's  populat ion 
2 
is,  the less effective will the atom bomb be . "  I f  the manpower 
was superior to nuclear weaponry , why undertake a nuclear program 
which is very expensive but as useless as a paper tiger? Deba tes 
on this question were very popular 1n much of the public d is­
cussion at that time a nd revealed to the world China ' s  interest 
in the d evelopment of nuclear weapons. 
To date , the establishment ot China ' s  nuclear capability has 
fundamentally altered the ba lance of power in Asia and created 
many problems for all or those Asian countries which are most 
concerned either about their own national secur i ty or about the 
prevention of Chinese aggression. In analy zing these problems and 
the new ba lance of power in Asia, it should be remembered that 
one of the most �mportant gOft ls or Chinese strategy 1 s  the remoYa l  
of American influence trom Asia. Efforts to achieve this goal 
have been promoted by China in the Korean War, Vietnam War and 
ma ny other revolutionary struggles in this area . In spite of 
these efforts ,  howeYer, China has auttered serious setba cks. 
( 2 ) . A Doak Barn ett, Communist China nd A 
American Polley New X orka Council on 
Inc. ,1966) ,P.1 16. 
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In brief,  frustration brought about by American intervention 
against China is fundamentally a result of American military 
superiority in Asia and China ' s  unwillingness to run the risk . 
of a nuclear war with the Uni ted State s .  In vie wing ot th i s  
si tuation, one may imagine that the most important Chinese 
objective would be the red uction of American military strength 
in Asia and the prevention of an American nuclear attack against 
China. 
At present, for a number of reasons, there is no possibility 
of a nuclear war between the United States and Ch1' na .  The 
Chinese und erstand that the acqui sition of nuclear weapons d oes 
not ,  by itself, grant them complete freed om of a c tion and , a s  
long as American nuclear power remains superior, i t  would be 
unwise for China to run the risk of nuclear war. For this reason , 
1 t  can be assumed that China ' s  nuclear policy i s ,  and will con­
tinue to be, primarily based on the future d evelopment of 1 ts 
nuclear capability . 
But how strong is China and how d oes it intend to employ its 
nuclear strength? Until one can assess accurately the weight of 
China ' s  nuclear capability , one can hard ly d etermine the inten­
tions of i ts nuclear policy . Obvioµ sly ,  evaluation of China ' s  
nuclear capability is d ifficult. Ind eed , there is no agreement 
among the world intelligence comm un i ty as to when China will 
possess both hyd roge n bombs and ICBMs with which to d eliver them. 
In 1967 u.s. Se cre tar1 of Defe nse R obe rt s. McNama ra pred icted 
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1n a speech before the United Press International Editors and 
Publishers that China will have an initial ICB� capability in the 
early 1970 s .  Based on this prediction, as the United States 
continues to explore the possibilities of inducing China to 
participate in a rms control efforts , it  can be assumed that the 
Chinese-oriented ABM sy stem will be on.e of the key i ssues of 
American arms control policy . The more frequent ques tions which 
arise in this area of concern are a first , is there any poss1- · 
bility that by the end of 19?0 ' s  China might become so incautious 
as to attempt a nuclear attack on the United States? and second , 
of the answer to t hi s  question 1 s  "y es,"  wha t should the Amer ican 
position be in regard to the Chine. se-oriented ABM sy stem? Al though 
it would be insane for China to attempt a nuclear attack on the 
United States ,  one can still conceive of certain conditions under 
which China might miscalculate. A Chinese-oriented ABM sy stem is 
thus designed to prevent the possible irrational behavior of 
China. Contrary to this ,  there are strong arguments in favor of 
try ing to reach American agreement with the Soviet Union so that 
nei ther will build anti-Chinese ABM sy stems. 
The purpose of this study is to describe and explain China ' s  
policy towards arms control and disa rmament. After the background 
chapter describing China ' s  nuclear policy , the study deals pr1maril7 
with some problems related to China ' s  emergence as a nuclear power. 
Chapter I anal7z es . the political and milita ry backgro und ot China ' s  
nuc lear polic7 and t hen anal7z es the role ot political and milita ry 
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factors in the . formation of nuclear policy . Chapter II enumerates 
the techno logical ingred ients of China ' s  nuclear capability and 
briefly relates the history of its nuclear d evelopment. Chapter 
III evaluates China ' s  polic7 alternatives in rel aion to strategic 
goals--removal of American influence from Asia and d issuasion of 
superpowers from nuclear attack against China. Chapter IV d escribes 
China ' s  at titud e toward s the partial test-ban treaty and nuclear 
non-proliferation treaty . In add ition to these two American-Soviet 
sponsored treaties, China ' s  proposals f or complete prohibition 
and thorough d estruction of nuclear weapons are consid ered . Finally, 
Chapter V turns to the evaluation of the Chinese-oriented ABM 
sy stem in light of the recent policy trend s in the United StatesG 
The principal focus of thi s study i s  on China i tself, but 
ev id ence is al so d rawn from reports and information of other 
countries = in regard to China ' s  real role in the fi eld of nuclear 
arms. Materials contained in the footnotes support snd amplify 
the analy sis in the text, primarily by quotations from public and 
officia l  statements. Furthermore, there are several points con­
cerning method ology which need to be elaborated . First, the author 
has purposely tried to avoid using any second ary sources re lating 
to the study of China ' a nuclear policy and stra tegy 1n order to 
red uce the possibil i ty of making mistakes 1n the translation of 
language. However , collection of Chinese original sources 1n the 
United Sta tes 1a extremely d1ft1cult because of security reasons . 
Therefore , the sources uaed in th1a::·:a:tudl ·ar e . .  not oni;r of Chinese 
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origin. Second, d espite the ta c t  that both the Na tiona list 
government and the Communist regime cla im to be the leg1t1ma te 
government of all of the Chinese, throughout the· study the 
author has used the term "China "  to mean tha t pa rt or China 
which is currently und er the control or the Communist regime . 
Third, the a uthor has long been ot the opinion tha t the ba sic 
impetus to China ' s  arm s control policy seems to have been the 
compelling natur e  or d omestic d evelopm ents, even though these 
were mad e  more a cute by the imps c t  or external d evelopments. For 
this rea son, the author has ad opted a research method to suggest 
interpreta tions for China ' s  arm s control policy equally ba sed 
on the ana ly sis ot d omestic d evelopments a s  well a s  specific 
external d evelopments . Lastly, the a uthor ha s no intention of 
pred icting some or the limita tions imposed on the future d evelop­
ment of China ' s  nuclea r ca pa bility beca use the a uthor believes, 
in a �apid ly changing international sy stem, i t  i s  a mista ke to 
tr1 to d raw conclus1ona with out ad equate kn o. led ge and informa tion. 
Chapter· One 
THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY BASIS 
OF THE CHINESE NUCLEAR POLICY 
Any discussion about the Chinese policy and strategy in nuclear 
age must begin with the fact that, .for: more than two decades, 
the Chinese policy can be understood as an outgrowth or her 
domestic affairs and a combination of her national interest and 
long-range goals expressed through the ideology of Mao Tse-tung 
thought.  Despite obstacles ,  the author suggests i t  i s  possible 
to make sense of the Chinese nuclear policy provided we take her 
political and military into account. 
In brief , the formation of the Chinese nuclear policy can be 
divided into two period• 1949-1957 and 1957 to the present. After 
1949a when the Chinese Communist were consolidating their power, 
they followed a moderate policy modeled to a great extent on the 
Soviet Union. During this period, friendly relations with the 
Soviet Union were a matter of importance for the Chinese Communist 
regime . assuring nuclear protection tor the newly established 
regime in exchange for partnership in world affairs. The policy 
ot "leaning to one side" was reflected in Mao•s article "On the 
People's Democratic D1ctatorsh1p" issued 1n 19491 
Externally, unit in a common struggle with those 
nations of the world which treat us equal and 
unit with the peoples of all countries.  That i s ,  
ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the 
People's Democracies, and with the proletariat and 
the broad masses or the peoples in all other coun­
tries, and torm an international united tront • • •  
- 11 -
In the light of the experiences accumulated in· 
these forty years and these twenty-eight years , 
all Chinese iwthout exception must lean either 
to the side of imperialism or to the side of 
socialism .  Si tting on the fence·will not·do, nor 
i s  there a third road .J 
Liu Shao-chi , a top leader of Communist China before the 
Cultural revolution , reiterated this position in the article 
"Internationalism and Nationalism . "  He wrote'I "If  one is not 
1n the imperialist camp • • •  then one must be in the anti-imperialist 
oamp • • •  so-called neutrality • • •  1 s  nothing but deception , inten-
4 
t1onal or· otherwise .. " Perhaps the real basis for the Chinese 
policy in this period was its faith in the deterrent effect of 
the atomic strength of the Soviet Union. American monopoly of 
nuclear weapons was eliminated in August ot 1949 with the successful 
detonation of a Russian A-bomb test. Furthermore , despite Communist 
Chlna's program of industrialization, China's modern technology 
was 11m1ted and i ts industries were vulnerable in the 1950s. The 
fact that the t1rst two �tomi� bombs were dropped a t  Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki make the Ch�nese leaders particularly worried about 
an American nuclear attack. Therefore , though one may find 1D&ny 
interpretations to this "leaning to one side" policy, there is 
every reason to believe that C ommWlist China's dependence upon 
the soviet Union was greater in respect to m1litar7 security than 
1n any other field. 
(J) . Mao �se-tung, " On the People's Democratic dictatorship," 
Selected Works , Volume 5 ,  (New Iork a International Publishers , 
1964) , P . 415. . 
(4) . Liu Shao-obi , Internationalism and �at1onal1am (Pekinga Foreign 
Language Presa, 1952) ,PP . )2•J). 
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This policy lasted witil 1957· After that several factor 
seemed to propel China toward an increasingly autonomous role. 
In general , "this new course 1n China's policy was an out­
growth ot external experiences that convinced the Chinese ot 
the feasibility ot pursu.ing a radicall7 independent course of 
s 
action . "  Between 1952 and 1957 China went through a transi-
tional phase ot testing out her strength, attempting to forge 
alliances with neutralist cowitries ot the third world within 
the framework of .economic aid diplomacy. At the Geneva Conference 
in 1954 and at the Bandung Conference in 1955, China offered to 
negotiate probelms that were sources of conflict and host111ty , 
provided China's interests and security were taken into full 
account. Externally, the Chinese continued to show an interest 
1n establishing themselves in Asia, Afr� , and South America. 
China agreed in 1956 to fund a $16 u.s. million trade deficit 
with Indonesia. Among the other earl7 recipients of Chinese aid 
6 
were Nepel, EgJPt, Cuba, Somalia, and Algeria .  
Indeed, the fo�tion of the new Chinese policy was based on 
the consideration of several factors . The first was the increasing 
border dispute between China and the soviet Union and its con­
sequent threat to Chi�'s securit7 . In 196J China publicly 
declared that the treaties which established the present Sino-Soviet 
(5 ) . Vera Simore , China in Revolution, H1storz,Doouments and 
Analyses.(�ew'¥ork1:Fawcett Publications, Inc . ,  1968.)P .J78. 
(6) .  Peter Andrews Poole , "Communist China'• Aid Diplomao7," in 
Aa1an Sur!•l• NoTeaber �966. Volwae VI .No . 11 . 
- lJ -
bord ers were unequal , ty pical of the settlements imposed on 
China by imperialists. The Sov iet Union refused to accept thi s 
accusation and would not agree that such an ad mission should 
accompany a re-examination of the whol• : bord er .  The C entral 
Committee of the Communist Part7 of the Sov iet Union stated in 
Nov ember 1963 thata 
�atua lly , we will not d efend the Russian Tsars 
who p ermitted arbitrariness in lay ing d own the 
the states boundaries with neighboring countries. 
w e  are conv inced that y ou ,  too , d o  not intend to 
d ef end the Chinese emperors who by force of arms 
seized not a few treaty terri tories belonging to 
others. But while cond emning the rea ctiona ry ac­
tions of the top- strata exploiters who held power 
in Russia and in China at that time , we cannot 
d i sregard the fact that historically- formed boun• · 
da ries between the states now exi st. Any attempt 
to ignore this can become the sources of mis­
und erstand ing and conflicts . 7  
Und oubted l7, the persisting tensions along the Sino-sov iet 
bord er and Moscow' s increasing attempts to set up a polit� cal 
. .  
structure in Asia n av e  ind uced the Chinese lead ers to re-examine 
the adv antages and necessity of d ev eloping nuclear weapons . 
In fact ,  the . Sino-��v iet d ispute can be consid ered as one ot 
the motiv e forces behind the Chinese nuclear policy . 
Second ., the interrelations of Chinese nuclear policy and the 
international s1tuat1on are obv 1ousl7 complex. No single or 
simple explanation can sutt1c e .  Howev er , an analy si s  of China ' s 
nuclear polic7 suggests the ta c t  that China ' s  polic7 respond s to 
( 7 ) . "Letter ot CPSU Central Committee to CCP Central Comm ittee, "  
29 Nov ember, 196J, Peking Review, 8 Ma 7, 1964. 
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the international situationa as l ong as her vital interests 
and maj or power status are threatened , her pol icy tends to 
be viol ent and aggr e ssive . The devel opment of Am erican defense 
sy stem in Asia , the establ ishm ent of SEATO and the increasing 
mil i tary strength of the United S tates in S outheast Asia were 
all early indications to the Chinese of a shift in American 
gl obal s trategy throughout the 1950 ' s .  I n  the 1960 ' s  American 
strategy appeared to take an even mor e  ominous turn a s  Asia 
increasingly di spl aced Europe as the center of A merican concern. 
Washington' s  former Europe-first strategy during this period 
was upset and abandoned because of the rising revol utionary 
8 
movements l ed by Communist China in Southeast Asia. The heart 
ot American pol icy towards China at this time was thata  
There i s  to be kept al ive a constant theat of 
mil i tary action v1 s-av1s Red China in the hope 
that at some point there will be an internal 
breakdown • • •  a col d  war waged under the l eadership 
of the United States with constant threa t of attack 
against Red China l ed by Formosa and other Far 
Eastern groups of mil i tary forc e s  supported by 
the United S tates . 9  
American pol icy was thus regarded, in the ey e s  of Communist 
China , as set on a path of escal ation which; was. particul arly 
dangerous for China. According to the Chinese , " confrontation 
wi th China, instead of the S oviet Union, 1 s  the:m 1l itary strategy 
( 8 ) . Arthur Huck, The Security of Chinas Chinese Appr oaches to 
Probl ems of War and S trategy (New I orka Col umbia University 
Press,1970),PP.45-46 . 
(9) . Test1mon7 of United S tates Assistant S•oretary of S tates 
Wal ter s .  R obertson at a congreaa1onal: inqu1ry. New York Tim es ,  
2 5  P ebrua r7 ,1954. 
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10 
Washington now subcribes to . "  Thus, the shift in American 
' 
global strateg7 ·,  toge�her with the fact that since the Quemo7 
crisis of. 1958 the Soviet Union. failed· to support China mili­
tar1lt in pursuit of a Chinese interest, forced China to con-
sider the importance of nuclear weapons. In fact ,  China' s  
national secui'it7 now depended on her own nuclear capability. 
The third. factor which affected China's nuclear policy was 
the decline of the role of the Sino-soviet alliance in defense 
of China ' s  security, By the late 1950 ' s  the strategic .. value or 
the alliance had been brought into question principally tor 
the following reasons• . 
( 1 ) ,  By seeking a · limited detente with �he United States , 
the Soviet Unlon in effect pursued a policy that 
prejudiced China ' s  prospects of obtaining her foreign 
goals which involved �hanging the·status· quo' in Far · 
Eastern and probably South-eastern Asia. 
( 2 ) .  The Soviet Union wished to have a measure of control 
over i ts giant neighbor and this obviously prejudiced 
China ' s  independence, As Chen.Yi remarked in late 
196J, presumably with reference to the Soviet offer 
of joint military c ommand in the spring of 1958 , "Soviet 
protection is worth nothing to us • • •  �o outsiders can 
give us protection, in fact because they always attach 
c·ond1 tions and wish to control us." 11 
It is impossible to estimate exactly what weight should be 
given to each of the various factors which have contributed ·to 
the shift 1n China' s  nuclear policy, but there can be no doubt 
( 10 ) ,  Peking Review, N o . ? ,  11February 1966. 
( 11 ) ,  Michael B. Yahula , "Chinese Foreign Polio7 after 196J1 The 
Mao's Phases," in Tbt China iwarterl1 , No,J6 ,oc tober 1968 , 
PP. 9.5-96. 
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that the Soviet Union's refusal to assist China to become a 
nuclear power further increased China's suspension of the 
Sino-soviet alliance. According to the. Chinese account of the 
matter, the Soviet Union promised to provide China with a 
sample of an atomic bomb and teohnic•l data concerning its 
manufacture , apparentl7 as part or an agreement on "new tech-
nology for national defense" concluded in October 1957, but 
unilaterally abrogated this agreement several years later and 
suddenly withdrew all the Russian technicians from China's 
industry in 1960. The crucial issue of the Soviet Union's 
assistance to the Chinese nuclear development probably concerned 
the question of control and command . As a price tor nuclear 
aid, the Soviet Union may have insisted on one or more of the 
following• (1) retention of Soviet control ot warheads or other 
weapons suppliess ( 2 )  some measures of Joint planning and/or 
command in the Far Easts (J)  Chinese assurance · that independent 
12 
military initiatives would not be undertaken , e.g. over Taiwan. 
In reality, the Soviet Union sought to bring China under military 
control , and China regarded auch an aim as infringing on her 
national. sovereignty. Since soviet desires were inconsistent 
with the Chinese policy of freedom ot action and Chinese deter­
mination to go it alone , China decided to pursue her nuclear 
program without Soviet assistance. 
( 12 ) .  John Gittings, Surfe7 ot the Sino-soviet Dispute ( Oxforda 
Oxford. Un1v.eraity .• Preas, 1968) ,P .lOJ. · 
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During recent y ears the Chinese have been keenly aware of 
the importance of nuclear weapons and the problems they pose t or 
their revolutiona ry ·struggle . Priority has n aturally been given 
to the avoidance of nuclear war with the United S tates or the 
S oviet Union, together with the enhancing ot China ' s  own··m1li­
tary strength. The� et ore , the maj or purpose of China ' s  nuclear 
program i s  to ne utralize the nuclear advantage of the superpow ers, 
leaving her mass army free to accomplish its goals. I n  strategic 
terms , China ' s  goal have been the acquisition of a nuclear de­
terrent against the superpowers and a second -s trike capability 
in case ot conf rontation wi th the United S tates or the S o� iet 
Union. I n  so far as Chinese nuclear policy has been a mixture of 
verbal violen c e  and practical caution, this policy has pro-
bably been due to the experience of being threatened with nuclear 
weapons in several instance s  by the United S tates. I n  the Korean 
War, Presi4ent Eisenhower made i t  clear that nuclear weapons 
might be used against China i f  China refused to accept t he 
1) 
armistice agreement. I n  the Taiwan S trait cri sis of 1954-1955 
and in the QU emoy cr1s1s of 1958, President Eisenhower and 
S ecretary of S tates Dulles again threatened the use of nucl ear 
weapons against China in the even� of open aggression in this 
area . I t  i s  true that, in these crises and other mili tary conflicts 
(1)). Harold c. Hinton, C oi�J'!1st China 1n W orld  Pol1ti c a  (New 
X ork1 Maoallllan, 19 ,P.222. 
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between the Uni ted States and Communist China. no nuclear weapons 
were actually used by the United States. but China had to cope 
with the American nuclear threat and consequently to adjust 
her policy accordingly. 
In addition to being guided by pure military considerations, 
the Chinese nuclear policy also derives strong support from 
political ideology. Although a political ideology may not alone 
provide a thesis strong enough to explain the foundation of the 
Chinese nuclear pclicy. it would be a mistake to underestimate 
the importance or political ideology in the forn&1on of the 
Chinese policy • . 
The aspects of the Chinese pol1t1cal ideology that are relevant 
to the question of arms control can be summarized as followsa 
( 1 )  In war , men are more important than weapons , and .poli­
tical-ideological factors more decisive than technologya 
( 2 )  As an aspirant to great-power status in theworld , China, 
nevertheless , will not be denied the technological 
appurtenance of such states--1ncluding nuclear weapons 
and missiless 
(J )  Except as a temporary tactical expedient in a " protracted 
struggle , "  accomodation with the "enemy" is tantamount 
to surrenders · 
(4 )  Any tactical or strategic advantage must be followed up 
aggressively either politically or mil1tar1ly.14 
The Chinese Communist leaders have long beenLof the:op1n1on 
( 14) . 
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that mili tary considerations must be subordinate to ideological 
and political considerations. the �hinese recognize constantly 
the fact that, in socialist countries, political.and psychological 
factors play a far greater role in military policy than they do 
in the capitalist countries. In general , however , analysis or 
such factors as well as Mao Tse-tung' a military writings con­
tained in h1• Selected Works enables one to reach conclus1ons 
as followsa 
Men versus Machines 
According to the Chinese , the decisive factor in war i s  not 
machines or weapons , but men. This principles has 1ts hi storical 
origin in the military history ot the Chinese Communists . As 
early as 19J8, in the first year of the Sino-Japanese, Mao Tse-tung 
attacked those who argued that ultimately 1t was armament that 
determined the outcome ot a wara 
. 
This is the so-called theory that 'weapons decide 
everything ,• which constitutes a mechanical approach 
to the question of war and a subjective and one-sided 
view. Our view i s  opposed to this1 we see not only 
weapons but also people . Weapons are an important 
factor in war, but not the decisive factors it ls 
people , not things, that are decisive. The contest 
of strength 1s not only a contest of military and 
economic power, but also a contest of human power 
�nd moral.15 
(15) . Mao Tse-tung, Selegt'' M111tarY ir1ting1 (Pek1nga �oreign 
Language Preas, 19 ) ,PP.217� 2 1 • · 
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In the nuclea r  a ge , · " the a tom bomb l s  a pa per tiger which 
the u .s .  rea ct1onar1es use to sca re people . I t  look s terrible , 
but in fa ct it i sn ' t .  Of c ourse , the a tom bomb is a wea pon or 
ma ss sla ughter, but the outcome of a wa r is decided by the 
16 
people , not by one or two new types of wea pons . "  Moreover, 
in nuclea r wa r ,  quantity a nd not qua lity will be the ma in 
considera tion. During the initia l  period of a wa r ,  deficiencies 
in quantity or quality of a rmaments can be compensa ted tor by 
the enthusia sm of the ma sses , and subsequently by their industry. 
Experiences of pa st wa rs in which the Chinese Communist ha ve 
enga ged would a ppea r  to cof1rm Ma o T se-tung ' s  v1ew on the a ubJ ecta 
On the contra ry,  we must exert a ll our eff orts:. 
to ma ke up t he lost ground a nd ca rry through a 
comprehensive politica l  mobiliza tion in order to 
overcome the e nemy. Much depends on this .  Our 
inferiority to the enemy in a rmaments a nd other 
equipment-.1 s  of secondly imorta nce. Poli tica l  
m1biliza t1on. i s  the rea lly prima ry concern. If 
the entire people l s  mobilized , theenemy will 
suffere he will be plunged into the depths of 
disa st er s  then conditions will be right for 
making up our deficiencies in the fiels of a rma- . 
ments ,  etc . a  we shall crea te the prerequi sites 
for overcoming a ll the deficiencies of wa r.17 
More specifica lly , the Chinese a rgue tha t the " spirit a tom 
bomb .. • -the politica l  consciousness of the people, the courage 
( 16 ) .  "Ta lk with a n  American correspondent A nna Lous1e Strong" 
1n Mao T ee- tun g ,  sl¥Toted �ori•· V olume IV , (Peking Foreign 
Language Press,  19 , P . 10 • 
( 17 ) .  Ma o T se-tung, IZbranp1e Prolzved evixa , (Selected W orks ) , 
T ra nsla ted troa the Chinese , V olume 11·, (Moscowt l95J ) ,P . 266. 
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an d sp1r1t of sacr1f1ce--w111 prov� to be the most importan t 
weapon s in war'I 
However highly developed modern weapon s an d tech­
n ical equipmen t may be an d however complicated 
the methods of modern warfare , in the fin al analysis 
the outcome of a war will be dicided by sustain ed 
fightin g of th e ground forc e s ,  by the fightin g at 
close quarters on battlefields • • •  The spirit atom 
bomb which the revolutionary peopl e  possess is a 
far more powerful an d useful weapon than the phy­
sical atom bomb. 18 
Mao Tse-tun g• s " paper tiger" doctrin e is n ot Just an exer­
cise in theory, for Mao i s  the supreme leader of military tho� ght 
in practics .  This "paper tiger" doctrin e ,  as C ohen says , ha s 
been put to good usea (a) to in fuse c ourage 1.n to the Chin ese 
masses by deliberately underplayin g the role of n uclear weapon s 
in mili tary strategy a and ( b) for use as a psychological sub­
structure on which to b uild a revolutionary attitude amon g the 
19 
emergen t and n ewly emergen ed peoples .  Such a doctrin e ,  which 
is very similar in mean in g an d political purpose to Len in ' s  
earlier characterization of imperialism as a ' colossus with 
feet of clay�• i s  founded basically on Narxism which regards 
men as the ultimate force in overcomin g all human and material 
obstacles. Kn owin g the terrifyin g  destructive capacity of n uclear 
weapon s ,  how ever, the Chin ese do n ot credit n uclear we apon s in 
their revolutionary struggles with imperialist · countries. 
( 18) • Lin Piao, "Lon g  Live the Victory of People• s War," in 
·Peking Revt ew,No . J6 ,  1965. PP . 26-27 . 
( 19) . Arthur A .  Cohen , The Commun i sm of Mao Tse-tung (Chicago • 
Vn 1vers1ty ot Chicago Press;, 1964) , P .60 . 
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The Morality of War 
In the Chinese view, imperiali sm i s  the sourc& of international 
war, and the threat of war will exist as long as imperialism 
remains . "War, this monster ot mutual slaughter among men, will 
be finally eliminated by the progress ot human societ7," Mao 
has said, "but there i s  onl7 one way to eliminate i t  and that 
20 
is to oppose war with war."  All wars are seen by the Chinese 
to be either just or unjust. The first category includes defen� 
sive wars , wars of national liberation, and civil wars of the 
oppressed aginst the oppressors . In his "Problems ot Strateg7 
in China's Revolutionary War," Mao Tse-tung wrote, "We support 
Just wars and oppose unjust wars. All counter-revolutionary wars 
21 
are unjust ,  all revolutionar7 wars are Just." 
The image of military and political conflicts between the 
oocialist countries and capitalist countries has given a com­
pletely difterent meaning to the Chinese notion of war. To the 
Chinese, war appears as a form of armed struggle,  an indi spen-
sable instrument in the strqggle for national liberation and 
independence. However different the Chinese notion ot war, 1t 
refers mainly to Lenin' s  works on the question of war and peace. 
( 20 ) .  Man Tse-tung, Selected Works, .V.olume· I ,  (New·Yorka Inter­
natlanal P�bl1ehere , 1955),P.17 9· 
( 21 ) . Mao Tee-tung, Selected M111tarl Writing, P . 79.  
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"Until the final issue ia decided ," said Lenin, " the state of 
awful war will continue ••• sentimentality is no leas a crime 
22 
than cowardice in war. "  Following the same line or reasoning, 
Mao said, "We ••• have no use for stupid scruples about benevo­
lenence, r1ghtousness and morality 1n war. In crder to win vic­
tory we must try our best to seal the eyes and ears of �he enemy, 
2J 
making him blind and deaf ."  
The �ature of Nuclear War 
Indeed , the Chinese appear to some extent to share with the 
Soviet Union an emphasis on the relatiohs between war and imper­
ialism. Leaders in Peking, however, hold a view quite different 
-
from that or the Soviet Union about the nature of nuclear war • 
... 
The ideological dispute between the Soviet and Communist China 
I 
centers mainly on the impact of nuclear weapons on the validity 
of Marxism-Leninism. To the Soviet Union, " the atomic bomb did 
not respect class laws, "  and "violent revolution was a dangerous 
path because i t  might trigger a nuclear holucaust which would 
wipe out all the gains of the revolution and destroy the economic 
and social base for further seizure or power by the Marxist-Leninist 
( 22 ) .  V .I.  Lenin, Selected Worke , Volume 9, (New Yorka International 
Publ1s1Utra , 194j),P.242. 
( 2J ) .  Mao Tae-tung, Selected worke.V.�lWll• 2. P.217. 
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parties." Moscow holds that violent revoiution must be aban-
doned and that nuclear �ar would be catastrophic ·r or all coun­
tries. C ontrary to the Soviet Union' s  view, the Chinese bravely 
contend that there 1s·no direct relations between revolutionary 
war and nuclear war. Moreover, if nuclear war broke out. a new 
civilization would rise from the debris or imperialism. 
The C hinese spoke in detail their statement of September 1, 
196J, about the meaning of their position on the nature of nu-
clear wara 
( 1 )  China wants peace, and not wars 
(2) It i s  the imperiali sts, and not we, who want to 
fight a wars 
( J )  A world war can be preventeds 
( 4) Even in the eventuality that imperiali sm should impose 
a war on the peoples of the world and inflict tragic 
losses on them, i t  i s  the imperialist ystem, and not 
man.kin�, that would perish, and the future of mankind 
would still be bright. 25 ' 
Though the Chinese continue to voice the line that exaggeration 
of the destructi�eness of nuclear war demoralizes the people of 
the socialist camp , they have been very cautious in their esti­
mation of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and take into 
(24). Morton H. Halperin, "Chinese Attitudes toward the Use and 
Control of �uclear Wlapons ," 1n Tang Tsou, ed,, China 1n Crts11. 
Volulhe.2·, : (Chicagoa Un1veraity'.Of Chicago Press, 1968) , P. l  B. • • 
( 25) . Ba71Dond L. Garthott, ed.,S1no-sov1et Ml��J'!rx Rolat1on1 
(�ew lorka Frederick Ae . �raeger,lno. ,19 �PP.227-228. 
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full account theimpact or nuclear weapons in decision-making 
relating to military policy. 
Disarmament as 'fa ctic and Strategy 
Theoretically, the Chinese constantly cite Lenin ' s  warnings 
that d i sarmament i s  a dangerous slogan in world revolution, 
because it can spread the illusion that peace and disarmament may 
come wi thout the triumph or Communi sm, In replying to a reader' s 
inquiry about the way to achieve a warless world , the edtor of 
China Youth , Februa ry 16 , 1960, declared• 
The so-called ' warless world ' --1 f it is not a childish 
fantasy--can only be a world where there i s  no imper1-
ialism • • •  where there is no class.  To realize this 
ideal, the human race must necessarily undergo a 
long-term, s 1nous, complicated and violent struggle 
so as to elimate imperialism and class • . At a time 
when the imperialists not only still exist but are 
even armed to the teeth, any thought that there is 
a short cut to realizing a • warless � orld ' will only 26 
disarm the people ' s  vigilance against the imperialist. 
In practice, the Chinese have consistently called for comple te 
prohibition and thorough des1tr uct1on of nuclear weapons through 
international consultations . Over the years , after each nuclear 
test, China, as. a  rule , has issued one or more policy statements 
related to the test. In these policy statements the Chinese have 
( 26 ) .  China Youth,· February 16 , 1960, Quoted in Dan N .  J acobs and 
Hans H .  Baerald, eds., Chinese Commun1sma Selected Doowpents 
(New Iorka Harper Torchbooks, 1963),P.164. 
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constantly stressed certain importance points. Some of these 
area 
.First, China calls for the complete prohi bit ion and thoroug h 
destruction of nuclear weapons. In the statement on her 1964 
nuclear test, tp e Chinese stated a 
In · developing nuclear weapons, China ' s  aim is to 
break the nuclear mono poly of the nuclear powers 
and to eliminate nuclear weapons. The Chinese 
Government a lso formally proposed to the· world ' s  
governmen ts that a sum mit conference of all coun­
tries be convened to discuss the question of the 
complete proh1b1t1on and thorough destruc tion of · 
nuclear weapons. 27 
Second , China declares that she will never at any time and 
under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons. 
after her hydrogen test 1n 1968, the C hinese stateda 
The Chinese Communist Government reiterates once 
again that the conducting of necessary and limi ted 
nuclear t ests and the development of nuclear wea­
pons by China are entirely for the purpose ofdef ense 
and for breaking the nuclear monopoly , with the 
ultimate aim .of abolishing nuclear weapons. We 
solemnly declare one again that at no time and in no 
circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear 
weapons. 28 
Third , China claims that she is developing her nuclear weapons 
tor the purpose of defense only. For example ,  after her 1964 test, 
China declared that " to defend one sel f is the inalienable right 
of every sovereign state • • •  China i s  forced to conduct nuclear 
( 2? ) . Peking ' s  � tatement on � uclear Teat,  ijew Iork Times , October 
17. 1964. 
( 28 ) .  Docum ents on � isarmament Publi shed by the US Government 
Printing O ffice , Washlngt� n ,D.C .  1968 ,P. 808.  -
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tests a nd develop nuclea r wea pons • • •  T he development of nuclea r  
wea pons by China i s  tor defense a nd for protecting the Chinese 
29 
people . "  
T he contra diction between China ' s  theory a nd practice over the 
question of disa rmament a nd nuclea r wea pons can be only exp la ined 
in terms of propa ga nda . Ea ch of China ' s  nuclea r tests held until 
1968 wa s portra yed a s  a triumph for the " thought ot Ma o T$ e-tung• 
and "a grea t � ncoura gement to the revolutiona ry people of the 
world. "  Most of these tests , furthermore , seem to ha ve been timed 
to dra matize Chinese rea c tion to some external events . The test 
ot October 16, 1964 , wa s clea rl y  timed to dra matize the fa ll or 
Kh rushchevs the test of October 27,  1966, wa s held a t  the time 
or U . S .  President Johnson ' s  visit to Asia ( South Vietnam a nd T haila nd) a 
and thetest of June l?,  1967 ,wa s  held a t  the time or the Soviet 
JO 
Union ' s  Premier Kosygin' s  visit to the United S tates .  Undoubtedly , 
the Chinese nuclea r te st sta tements a nd her proposals for disa rma -
ment, with such a low cha nce of a cceptance , must be viewed prima rily 
as propa ganda a nd tactic in her nuclea r  policy . 
(29 ) .  Peking ' s  Sta1Lement on Nuclea r T est,  New l ork times, October 
17,  1964 . 
()0) . ueat An A na l  s a or 
Bloomington• India na 
Chapter T wo 
THE DEV£LOPMENT OF CHINA ' S  �UCLEAR CAPABILITI 
Although the Chi nese have been keenly impressed by the des­
tructi veness of nuclear weapons , no evidence or China ' s  i nten­
ti on to develop her nuclear capabi li ty could be found before 
1957 . T he Chi nese appear to have launched thei r  nuclear weapons 
program only i n  1957· T he establi shment of the Insti tute ot 
Atomi c Energy and the aci evement or techni cal agreement wi th 
the Sovi et Uni on i n  1957 marked the turni ng point i n  Chi na ' s  
industri al development. T he fi rst offi cial statement by a Chinese 
offi cial ot C hina ' s  1ntent1on to develop nuclear weap ons cam e 
in 1958 ,  when Li u Ya-lou, the Commander-i n-chi ef of the Chi nese 
Ai r Force,  wrote • 
Chi na ' s  worki ng calss and sci enti sts wi ll certain 
be able to iaa ke the most up-to-date ai rcraft and 
atomi c bombs i n  the not di sta nt future • • •  By that 
ti me •.• •  we can use atomi c weapons and gui ded mi ssi les 
• •• in copi ng wi th the enemi es who dare to i nvade 
our oountry. 31 
In October, 1961, Lord Montgomery report- ed Chou En-lai a s  
sa yi ng " that the government had deci ded to proceed wi th plans 
32 
for developing nuclear weapons for the armed forces . "  
Wi th regard to Chi na ' s  nuclear weapons development and testi ng 
(31 ) .  " Seri ously Study Mao T se-tung•a Mi li ta ry T hinki ng , "  Li beration 
Army b ewspaper, May 2J,  19581 quoted 1n ' Morton H .  Halperi n ,  
China and the Bomb (New Y orka Frederi c k  • • Praeger Publi shers , 
1965),p .7 2 .  
( 32 ) .  Fi eld f1arshall Montgomery, "Chi na  on the Move , "  Sunday Times 
(London� .  October 15,  1961. 
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program , from 16 October, 1964, to the end of September, 1969, 
a period of five Y. ears, _the Chinese detonated 10 nuclear devices. 
Six were air-dropped , two were detonated on a tower, ane one 
was delivered by a missile. The first nuclear test was success­
fully conducted on October 16, 1964, on the test groun d at Lop 
Nor in Sinkiang, Significantly i t  was a fission device built ot 
enriched uranium ( U-2J5 ) , which produced a yield equivalent to 
20 kilotons of T.N.T.  This test had two implications. First, 
China was capable of extracting fissiona ble U-2J5 in substan-' 
tial quanti ties on a large scale through its gaseuus diffusion 
plant, Second , since enriched uranium (U-2J5) could increase a 
country' s capability to produce tri tium , a basic component of 
thermonuclear bombs, the result of this test suggested tha t 
)J 
China might have intented to develop hydrogen bombs . On May 
14, 1965, China conducted her seoond=nuclear testa  a bomb dropped 
from a plane was exploded over the same site as the previous 
one . The u.s. sources( estimated the force of the detonation as 
equivalent to that produced by the explosion or perhaps a little 
more than 20 kilotons ot T.N .T. The third test tool place on 
May 9 ,  1966·, a t  the same test site near Lop Nor. This was t he 
first Chinese alaim of the use of " thermonuclear ma terial" 1n 
a test. The presence of the· thermonuclear material (li thium-6) 
( JJ ) . Leo Iueh-1un Liu, "China' s  Attitude Towards Her Nuclear 
Weapons , "  in China Report ,  Voluae .Vll , No.),  1971 , P . )4 .  
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1n the test inducated that a thermonuclear reaction had occurred , 
because a yield or more than 200 kilotons was greater than 
J4 
that obtained fro� just a fission bomb. Therefore , this 
test was probably accomplished by a combination or a fi ssion 
·and a fusion. 
Despite the tact that two factors may have affected the rate 
. . 
of development or C�ina ' s  nuclear program ( the deterioration in 
China ' s  economic situation since the Great Leap Forward Movement 
and the withdrawal or Soviet technicians in mid-1960 ) ,  the 
Cultural revolution did not seriously slow China ' s  nuclear 
program. Indeed , the Chinese conducted three nuclear tests 
during the period when China was reported to be in the chaos of 
,.J 
Cultural revolution. 
On October 27,  1966, China conducted her fourth test , using 
a nuclear warhead on a guided missile . This missile involved a 
Soviet-type ss-4 medium-range ballistic missile and carried a . 
warhead made or urani\im (U-2J5) a distance or approximately 400 
miles. The fifth test was a bomb detonation on December 28,  1966. 
I t  was reported tha:t a triple stage ( or fiaaion-rus1on-ti ss1on) 
nuclear device was used along with aome fissionable uran1mu-2J8 
in this test. The sixth test,  which consisted of a hydrogen bomb, 
( )4) .  l�ew Xork '1'1mes • May 21 , 1966. 
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came on �un e 17. 1967. I ts blast produced a powerful yield 
equivalent to three-seven megatons of T . � . T .  The u . s .  Joint 
Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy commented on this 
test as followsa 
The sixth Chinese nuclear test has confirmed 
the conclusion reached from the analysis of 
the fifth Chinese nuclear test that they 
are ma�ing exc�llent progress 1n the thermo­
nuclear design . JS 
In December 196? China conducted another thermonuclear ·test 
that Western analysts Judged an abortive test. I t  produced a 
yield equalvalent to 20 , 000 tone of T . N . T .  After this test,  
there was no nuclear test until December 27,  1968 , when a hy­
drogen bomb was detonated . I t  produced a 7ield equavalent to 
three megatons of T . N . T .  The u . s .  Atomic Energy Committee con-
firmed i t  to be a thermonuclear test. Finally, in September, 
1969, two tests were conducted 1n rapid succession. The first 
one was an underground nuclear detonation conducted on September 
22 , which produced an explosion equavalent to 200-250 kilotons 
of T . N . T .  The second one was a hydrogen bomb explosion equavalent 
to three megatons of T.N.T.  
Despite the lack ot informa tion on the underground test,  the 
fact that China chose to conduct an underground nuclear test 
< JS> . Impact of Chinese Communi st Nuclear Weapons Progress on 
Uni ted States National Security, Report of ' the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Ene rgy, Congress ot the Unitd States 
(Waah1ngton,D.c . a  u . s .  Governaent Pr1nt1ng O ffice·, 1967) ,P.2.  
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raises questions which need to be elaborated. The two most 
plausible reasons . for a Chinese undergroun d nuclear test 1n 
1969 appear to be , first, that the Chinese are interested 1n 
setting up controlled experiments whereb7 they can more ertec­
ti vely analyze nuclear-design information, as well as the 
physical effects ot a detonation and , secondly, that the 
Chinese seek to den7 to both Western and Soviet analysts debris 
and other technical intelligence material , since they are . 
beginning to teat taotioal nuclear weapons designed for battle-
J6 
field use . 
To date , the Chinese have tested a number of relatively small 
nuclear weappns· ranging from 10 kilotons to JO kilotons each 
that can be delivered b7 a tactical fighter-bomber of Chinese 
J7 
design, knowm in the West as the F-9. The Chinese nuclear test 
1n November 1971 and the ·test in January 1972 were also reported 
to be under 20 kilotons ot Y . N . T .  
Following the 1969 test,  obvious.17, a major shift in the nuclear 
program has been adopted by the Chinese due to the increasing 
threat or the Soviet Union. In the author' s  opinion, develop-
ment of ICBM capability is the next step in the Chinese nuclear 
program. O n  the other hand , the high priority of the nuclear 
( J6) . Alice Lagley Hsieh, "China ' s  Nuolear•M1ee1l.e Programme • 
Regional or International?" in China guarter11, Januar7-
March, No.45, 1971, P.88 .  
( )7) . �ew Xork T1m11, JUl.7 25, 1972 . 
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program has been changed by the C hinese from long-range missile 
to small tactical missiles which can attack some mili tary targets 
in the Soviet Union ' s  Far East territory. More plausible i s  
the possibility that the Chinese may be experimenting not only 
in the size of the nuclear device but also wtth the amount of 
fissionable material i t  contains. This fact can be supported . on 
the ·following grounds. First, with the increasing tension along 
the Sino-soviet border, the Chinese have to demostrate their 
nuclear po�ential in sufficiently clear terms for the soviet 
Union to keep the border di spute strictly under control. The 
possession of small tactical nuclear weapons might well be �e­
garded by the Chinese as an important attack weapon against the 
Soviet Union ' s  troop concentration and land operations in the 
event of a border conflict.  Second , since the tactical nuclear 
weapons can be regarded a& an effective weapon against troop 
concentration and land operation in a local or limited nuclear 
war, the Chinese might believe that the possession of small 
tactical nuclear weapona could act either as a direct deterrent 
against the use of such weapon by the United �tates or as an 
indirect deterrent by · forcing the non-Communi st �loc countries 
to put pressure on the United States to prevent the use of such 
weapons. 
Of course, while no one in the West can calculate with certainty, 
it i s  conserTat1Tel7 estimated that China hal at least S0-100 
tactical nuolear weapons in her arsenal . She- 1• alao maea-produc1ng 
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the F-9 fighter-bomber at the rate of about 15 a month , and of 
the JOO produced in 1970-1972 , at least 200 have already been 
placed in operational squadroDs .  
Date 
Oct 16,1964 
May 14, 1965 
May 9 , 1966 
Oct 2?,1966 
Dec 28, 1966 
Jun l?, 1967 
Dec 24,1967 
Dec 27, 1968 
Sep 22 , 1969 
Sep 29, 1969 
Oct 14 , 1970 
Nov 18, 1971 
Jan --, 1972 
Note • F--f1 ss1ons 
TABLE · I 
Chinese Nuclear Test,  1964-1972 
I1eld Type 
20( k1lotons) F 
40-50 F 
200 F 
20 F 
)00-500 F 
3 ,000-1.000 TN 
20 F 
J , 000 TN 
25 F 
J , 000 TN 
), 000 . TN 
20 F 
20 F 
TN--thermonuclear( fus1on) 
Remarks 
Tower-mounted 
Air-dropped 
Air-dropped 
Miss1le-del1eved 
Tower-mounted 
Air-dropped 
A1r-fropped 
Air-dropped 
Air-fropped 
Air-tropped 
Sources• VoJ·tech Mastny , ed . , 1 sarm men and Nuclear Tests 1 64-
1969 (New Iorka Facts on ile ,Inc . , 1970 1 Leo Yueh-yun 11u, 
"China ' s  Attitude towards He r Nucle ar Weapons , "  in China 
Report , . Volume VII , No.)6 , 1971 • Strates�c surve1, (London, 
The Inetitue tor S trategic Studie s , 1970 1 ti•• York Times. 
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The production of nuclear weapons requires sophisticated 
undustrial technology and the expe�di ture of large sum of 
money. In his "Scientific and Engineering Manpower in Communist 
China , 1949-196J" , Chu-yuan Cheng estimates that some 400 senior 
scientifists were engaged in a tip level nuclear program in 
the Chiese Institute of A tomic Energy and several universities 
JS 
centers by 1964. And by the end of 1965 at least tive of the 
eight ministries of machine-building industries were devoted 
to defense purposes. 
The elite group of Chinese nuclear scientists includes Chien 
Hsueh-shen( sho holds a Ph.D. from California Institute of Tech­
nology) , who was director of the US Scientific Commission of 
National Defense during the World War II years and a former 
professor ot Jet Propulsion at the California Insti tute of Tech­
nology , Tsien San-tsiang (Director of the Chinese Institute of 
Atomic Energy) ,  Wang Kan-chang ( who was educated in Germany 
before the World �ar II and was a research associate at the 
University of California , Berkeley, in 1947-1948 ) ,  Chien We-chang 
(who had been at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory ot the California 
Insti tute of Technology) ,  and Wei Chung-hua (who had been at the 
Massaechusetts Insti tute ot Technology ) .  Many Chinese scientists 
( )8 ) .  
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had also been trained in the Dubna Institute for nuclear 
research in the SoYiet Union before the open Sino-soYiet 
split occurred. 
With these first-rate nuclear scientists and som many research 
and technical personnel , the Chine.se should not .have any diffi­
culty in developing nuclear weapons in the coming years. There­
fore , the only remaining implication of China ' s  nuclear program 
in the next decade would be the economic s1tuat1on. In agreement 
with the hypothesis that " there exists an exact correlation between 
the nations with the highest military budget and the nations that 
J9 
have achieved the use or nuclear arms , "  then, an examination 
of the economic feasibility of china ' s  nuclear program appear to 
be necessary and useful in evaluating China ' s  potential for fur­
ther nuclear development. Since a country' s  GNP is probably the 
most significant indicator or its overall economic capability, the 
growth rate or China ' s  GNP must be considered as one of the factors 
which can affect her nuclear development. 
Basically, there are two routes that China can tallow in deve­
loping her nuclear weapons.  The first invol vea the construe t1on 
of atomic reactors that use natural uranium to produce weapons­
grade ·plutonium. The second i s  to build a gaseous diffusion 
( )9) . Gustava Lagoa, "International Stratification and Atomi c , "  
1 n  Richard A .  Palk, Saul H .  Mendlontz , ed . , D111rmam�nt 
and Eoon91a10 peyelopa1nt(N1w Iorka W orld Law Fund ,19& ) ,P. 584. 
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plant to separate uranium and ye1ld weapons-grade 2)8 . A 
nuclear reactor capable ot producing enough fissionable material . 41 
for one weapon per year would oost about $50 million, and a 
gaseous d1ffus1on · plant l s . estimated to cost approximately one 
42 
b1lion dollars .  
This is ind·eed a high cost, but i t  is unlikely that the Chinese , 
1n developing their puclear weapons, have found their rate of . 
economic growth to have been affected seriously by their nuclear 
program. On the contrary , the slowness of economic growth may 
be considered as one or the reasons for the stagnation of·  China ' s  
nuclear program during the year 1968-1969. Since nuclear capa-
bility i s  largely determined by economic capability, and a country' s  
G�P is probably the most significant indicator or i ts overall 
economic capability, therefore , a study of China ' s  GNP trom 1957-
197- would provide us a more practical basis ot Judging China ' s  
nuclear potential .  
I n  terms of GNP , China has been ranked fifth ($46,256 , 000 , 000 ) , 
after the United States ( $44) ,270 , 000 , 000 ) ,  the Soviet Union 
($121 , 920,000 , 000 ) , the United Kingdom ( 461 , 379, 000 , 000 ) ,  and 
West Germany . ($49 , 906 , 000, 000) 1n 1957. Using 1960 data ,  China 
(40 ) . Morton H .  Halperin, China and the Bomb, P . 7J• 
(41 ) .  Leonard Beaton , John Maddox, The S�rjad of Nuclear W eapons 
(New Xork 1 Fredrick A .  Praeger, 19 2 ,P .22.  
(42 ) .  Arnold Kramleh, The Peaceful Atom 1n foreign Pol.12.Z (New 
York• Harper Row, for the Council on Poreign Rela tions , 
196J ) ,P.14 . 
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has been ranked eight with a GNP of $50 , 000 , 000,000. In 1961, 
China ' s  G�P was estimated to be about $57 , 844 , ooo, ooo. These 
figures indicated a slow but steady rate of economic growth. 
Although the Chinese conducted three nuclear tests and scien-
tiests were to be treated gently during the Cultural revolution 
years , the Cultural revolution was apparently an obstacle to 
China ' s  economic development. In the author • s  opinion, there 
seems to be indirect relations between the absence of China ' � · 
nucl�ar testing from December, 1967 to December, 1968 and her 
political chaos and economic depression. In a speech to a rally 
on October, 1967 , Chou En-la1 admitted that .the Cultural revo-
lution had at least complicated the tasks of economic and nuclear 
development. He saida . 
I t  is already clear that there will be another 
bumper harvest in agriculture this year. Within 
the space of less than one year, we have conducted 
three nuclear tests , including a guided missile 
nuclear weapon test and a hydrogen bomb• Such a 
world-shaking revolutionary movement. of course 
exacts a certain price in production in certain 
places and in certain departments. We took this 
into account in advance. Production is affected 
to a certain extent, especially in places where 
disturbance occur. But this is only a transient 
thing. As soon as disorder is turned into order, 
production can quickly pick up and ri se.44 
Ho�ever, after the Cultural revolution, China ' s  economic growth 
has been maintained at a normal level. Using extensive material 
(4J ) . Robert C .  North, The Foreign Relations of China (New York a 
Dickenson Publishing C ompany , Inc . , 1969) , P.19. 
(44) , Walter c. Clemens ,Jr. The Arma Race and Sino-soviet Relatons 
(California • Stanford University, Hoover Insti tute .F�bl1cat1ona, 
1968) , P .lOO. 
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from publi shed aouroea,  the World �conomio Surve1 observes 
that ln 1971 "China maintained the high rates of economic growth 
45 
. 
of recent years." 
TABLE II 
Gross National Produot(GNP ) .People ' s  Re public of China 
(196J-1971) 
Year GNP (Billion ot Dollars) 
l96J 82 .46 
1964 89. 99 
1965 97.15 
1966 104 . 96 
1967 101.11 
1968 99.71 
1969 109.)6 
1970 121 .87 
1971 128 . 39 
Sources1 People ' s  Republic of China 1  An Asse ssme nt , 
A Compendium of Papers submi tted to the 
Joint Economic C ommittee, C ongress of the 
United States , ( u. s .  Governmental Printing 
Ott1ce , Washington, 1972 ) , P .47 
(45 ) .  World Econom1o SUfTtl 1971, publ1•hed b7 the United Nat1one, 
ll9?2) ,P.62 . 
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Although the analysis of the Chinese GNP allows us to relate 
easily China ' s  economic and military strength , the real function 
of GNP , in calculating China ' s  nuclear potential , depends on 
the percentage of military expenditures in the total GNP. According 
to u .s. Arms C ontrol and Disarmament Agency statistics, China 
ranked seventh in milital'y expenditures among all countries during 
the year 1967. The military expenditures for China ' s  nuclear 
weapons program have been estimatee as J.S billion. yuan a year 
46 
in 1966-68, and they have been held within. a range of J to 4 
47 
billion annual.ly trom 1969 on. Based on the tact that the 
capital costs for research and development need a iarge sum of 
money , i t  i s  possible that the additional military expenditures 
required in China ' s  future nuclear develop:nent may substantially 
exceed this level if some new weapons program are initiated by 
Commun ist China in the coming years. But, in evaluating the 
cost of Chinese weapons program, the American exper�ence of rising 
reserach and development need not apply to the Chinese case. Two 
reason may accoun t  for the ditterence . First, the large and 
rising labor . costs 1n American weapons research and development 
will not exis� in China because or the absence or oompetetive 
market there . Second , Chinese labor coats are low relative to 
48 
material costs in comparia1on with the United States . 
( 46) • A ratio or J or 4 7U&n to the us dollar may be used in 
this case. 
(47) . Communist China & Arms Con 
197 California• S·tndford 
Publ1cat1ona, 1968 ) ,P.60.  
(4� ) . Ibid . ,P .61. 
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Analysis of China ' s  G�P and her military expenditures allows 
us to see the fact that China ' s  nuclear weapons· program has 
costed her the equivalent of approximately two percent of her 
G�P. On the basis on this conclusion, i t  i s  clear that certaµi 
factor, both economic and noneconomic ,  any affect the actual 
rate of growth of the �hinese economy and may therefore affect 
China ' s  nuclear weapons program. Moreover, the annual expen­
diture on the nuclear weapons program is such a small portion 
of the GNP that the Chinese may not concerned with the economic 
costs involved. In the coming years, Communi st China ' s  economy 
will be able to sustain and support her nuclear weapons program 
without too much strain. Since these ctJ.nclusions are based on 
the assumptions that C onmiunist China will continue to maintain 
a high rate of economic growth and that there will be no . massive 
expansion of nuclear program in the future , the.se conclusions 
may be altered as these two assumptions change . Even with a 
very high rate of .GNP growth the Chinese nuclear capability, as 
a whole, would at.ill be far from fully developed by 1976 in 
comparison with the United States and the Spviet Union. 
Cha pter Three 
CHINA'S NUCLEAR STBATBGY 
Granted that no one tactor or constella ti on or factors wi ll 
a lways determi ne Chi na ' s  nuclea r poli cy ,  i t  seems clesr ·that 
mi li tary and strategi c  consderati ons ettecti vely account for 
many of the important deci �1 ons i n  China ' s  poli c y ,  pa rti cularly 
1n a rms control and related matters. In the previ ous chapter 
severa l factors whi ch can a ffect China ' s  nuclear ca pabi li ty have 
been analyzed. In the forseea ble tuture , a nuclea r weapons 
program wi ll be fully developed by Communist C hi na  so tha t she 
possesses a mini mum nuclea r "deterrent" against the Un1ted 
Sta tes and the Sovi et Uni on .  But, how wi ll the Chi nese use 
thei r nuclea r weapons i n  thei r struggles a gainst the imperia li st 
coun�ri es? What, then, a re the princi ples whi ch gui de China ' s  
stra tegy and her sci ence of revo1Qt1on i n  the nuclear age? To 
obtain a deeper i nsi ght i nto the dynami c s  of Commun1st China ' s  
poli cy ,  we now turn to the examinati on o� the posi ti ons taken 
by Peki ng on matters of war, pea c e ,  and di sa rmament s  also to the 
problems and prospects a for the future emergi ng from thi s 1nter­
act1on of mi li tary a nd strategic consi derati ons. · 
In fac t ,  Chi na ' s  strategi c  policy ha s been closely related to 
certai n domesti c  and i nt�rnati onal i ssues over the years. The 
followi ng analysi s concentra tes on some. of these i ssues and thei r 
impli ca ti ons. In compa ri son wi th the stra tegi c thought ot the 
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Soviet Union, Chinese policy may be divided into three periods 
reflecting the shifts in outlook• 
A . )  1949 to 19561 Depreciation of Nuclear Weapons and 
Emphasis on Manpower in War. 
B . )  1957 to 19641 Growing Awareness of the Implications 
of Nuclear Weapons and Propaganda for C omplete and 
Thorough Destruction of Nuclear Weapons. 
C . )  October, 1964 to Presenta Balance of "Nuclear Deterrence" 
and Negotiation with the United State s .  
On matters such a s  arms c ontrol and nuclear weapons, both 
the Soviet Union and Communist China agree that "Leninism" 
should guide Communi st pol1oy. but they disagree radically over 
interpretation. The doctrinal controversies preceding and following 
the open schism between the Soviet Union and China in 196J pro­
vide an essential 1f only pantial source of information con­
cerning the general nature of the Chinese nuclear strategy. Dis­
cussion in this chapter of necessity includes some· imaterial on 
the Sino-soviet nuclear dialogue and its consequent impact on 
the Chinese leader' s  strattegic thought. But, what is more impor­
tant 1 s  the impact of domestic and international events on 
China ' s  nuclear strategy . 
A .  1949 to 1956• Depreciation of Nuclear Weapons and Emphasis 
on Manpower in War • •  
Mention in the Chinese Communist docum ents and press of _ the 
implications or nuclear weapons was rare 1n thla _ pe�1od. In tact ,  
when they are 41acuaaed, one notioea a depreciati on ot their 
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importance and effectiveness. For example, in the Korean War . 
period , when the Chinese were afraid of American nuclear attack, 
Communist China ' s  leaders tried to minimize nuclear weapon! s 
battlefield usefulness in order to maintain troops moral . 
The atomic bomb i tself cannot be a decisive factor 
in a war • • •  Moreover, the atomic bomb has many draw­
backs as a mili tary weapon;1 i . e . ,  in the first place ,  
the length of time for manufacture and the high 
cost which prohibits learge-scale production • • •  sen­
ondly, because or i ts highly destructive power, it 
cannot be employed on the battlefield to destroy 
directly the fighting power of the opposing army , 
in order not to annihilate the users themselves .  
Thirdly, i t  can only be used against a big and con­
centrated obJective like a big armament industry center 
or huge concentrations of troops .  Therefore , the 
more extensive the opponet ' s  territory 1s a�d the 
more scattered the opponent' s populatio 1s,  the less 
effective will the atomic bomb be.49 
It is difficult to get a precise impression as to the kind 
of nuclear attack the Chinese considered likely, and i t  is 
even· more difficult to understand the real reasons why the 
Chinese depreciated nuclear weapons before 1957• However, two 
faotors lllllY e�pla1n the Chinese attitude •  firs t, one which still 
has a great effect ,  is that Mao Tse-tung• s political ideology 
lnh1b1ted him from duscussing implications of a situation in 
which weapons might be decisive over mens secondly , and probably 
the more important factor, here, is  that the �oviet Union had 
50 
not formulated i ts strategic doctrine at this time. 
(49 ) . Arthilr E .  Harrison, . Peking' s Nuclear Strategy(Urbanaa 
University of Illinois,  1966) ,PP . Jl•J2. 
( 50 ) . Alice Langley Hsieh, Communi st China ' s  Nuclear Strategy 
( Englewood Cal1fta , N .J . aPrent1oe-Hall , 1962),P.8 
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B. 1957 to 19641 Growing Awareness of the Implications of · 
Nuclear Weapons .  
In this period, the potential destructiveness of nuclear 
weapons was carefully estimated by the Chinese . Copies of the 
1961 issues of the Chinese classified mtli tary publication 
Work Correspondence released by the United S tates Government 
ln 196J reveal that the Chinese believed that the United States 
would have to invade China ' s  terri tory even after a nuclear 
attack. Consequently, they admitted the great destructiveness 
of nuclear weapons. Lewis has written" 
The documents suggest no Soviet assistance in case 
of war .  The Chinese Communist do not appear to expect 
an immediate conflict with the United States but 
nei ther do they rule out the possibility of a surprise 
attack by Ameri.can military forces.  The fear of sudden 
moves by the United States presumably prompted a · ' ·· 
tightenting of confidentiaal and security work in 
1961, r'or exampile. The Work Correspondence series 
highlights the Chinese Communist dread of nuclear 
and bacterial warfare on the one hand and the hope 
of attaining advanced weapons and technical exper-
tise -on the other. In several documents a shift in 
militaary training programs to prepare for scien-
tific and technological advances in coming few years 
i s  noted , bu.t in the meantime the Chinese Communi st 
have adopted a passive strategy of dispersal in order 
to survive nuclear attack and hence to wage " close 
combat" with invading group forces . Maintenance of 
of internal communication after nuclear attack has 51 
become a ·primary mission of radio and si·gnal personnel .  
Several factors in thi s period indicated a coming shift related 
to a change in the Chinese strategy and a re-evaluation of the 
( 51) . John Wilson Lewis , Chinese Communist Party Leadership and 
the Success1on · to Mao Tse-tung1 An Apprai sal of Tensions, 
(u. s .  Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research , Pol1c7 Research Study ,1964 ) ,P.28 
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nuclear weapons. 
l .  S trategic Balance and Soviet Un1on • s  ICBM Te sta The East 
Wind Prevails over the West Wind. 
The period of China ' s  greatest fear of the nuclear imbalance 
between the capi talist countries and the C ommuni st countries 
came to an end in 1957 with the launching of the Soviet Union' s 
sputnik and with the Soviet Union' s first ICBM test. The C hinese 
concluded that a fundamental change had taken place in the 
nuclear balanc e a  The East wind was now prevailing over the West 
wind . In his famous speech of NOvember 18, 1957, Mao Tse-tung 
declared • 
I t  i s  my opinion that the 'international situation 
has now reached a new turning point. There are 
two winds in the world today, the East wind and 
the West wind. There i s  a Chinese saying , "Ei ther 
the East wind prevails over the West wind or the 
West wind prevails over the East wind . "  I t  is 
characteristic of the situa tion today, I believe , 
that. the East wind i s  prevailing over the West 
wind . That is to say , the forces of socialism are 52 
overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism. 
In the Chinese view, the ·. soviet Union ' s  ICBM had two positive 
implicationsa ( a )  it provided a nuclear deterrent adequate to 
cover Chinese terri tory 1 and ( b ) i t  allowed Pek�rig greater pol1-
5J 
t1cal and mili tary flexibility behind the Soviet shield. 
( 52 )  • •  J ohn Gi tting , Suryex ot the S1no-Sov1et D1spute,P.82. 
( 5J ) . Arthur g ,  Barr1aon. Pek1ng'• Nuclear StrateSJ , P . 50 .  
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'fhe Chinese became more vocally mil itant than the Soviet Union 
in their support of revol utionary movement. In fact they tried 
to take advantages of the changing strategio balance by adopting 
an offensive mined strategy . On the one hand , the Chinese fel t 
that the United States was l argely deterred by the Soviet 
Union from a · total war. On· the other hand , the Chinese wanted 
to create the impression of a United states with a propensity 
towards l ocal war wars, even if 1 t  coul dn' t win. They cited 
the new u . s .  rel iance on " brinkmanship" and "l imited war" · stra-
tegy .advpcated by Dull es and Kissinger, as evidence of u . s  pre-
parations for l imited nucl ear war and a shift in gl obal strategy . 
The Chinese thus expnaded their mil itary progress and did not 
hesitate , 1 as shown by her attack on Quemoy in 1958 and her attack 
on India in 1962, to deviate from peaceful coexistence in order 
to make sure that the East wind woul d continue to prevail over 
the West wind. 
2 .  Domestic Debate over Defense Modernizationa Mil itary Moderni­
zation or Industrial Devel opment. 
Whil e the · soviet ' Union' s ICBM test was an important event 
rel a.ted to the fundamental shift 1n Chiba ' a strategy • it was not •  
however,  the only explanation of the growing awareness by Peking 
of the 1mpl 1cat1ons ot nucl ear weapons. 
The Domestic debate between professional mil itary l eaders and 
party l eaders over the question of prior1 t1ea 1n Ch1ha ' a  national 
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policy, together with the hints appearing in the early period 
of 1960 ' •  ot the Sino-Soviet 14eolosioal 41spute, retleoted 
the growing awareness by China ' s  policy-makers ot the destruc­
tiveness of nuclear weapons and their implications tor strategy, 
Some Chinese military leaders , having a normal desire to be 
self-reliant and prepared for: national defense , indicated their 
awareness of the possible consequences of a sudden nuclear 
attack and , thus, emphasized mili tary modernizationa a trained 
and well-equipped army, as well as an advanced weapons program. 
In line with this evaluation of the strategic context and nuclear 
weap�ns , Liu Po-cheug noted a 
With the emersenqe of atomic weapons and Jet weapons , 
m111 tary science has registered a new development . 
I t  i s  anticipated that war in the future will be 
a combined operation by the land forces,  naval forces, 
parachutes ,  and air defense units carried out on 
land , and sea , and in the air. Only with the indus­
trialization of the state will there be the physical 
foundation of national defense will there be pro­
tection for the industrialization of the s tate. 54 
On the contrary, party and polittcal leaders ,  who obviously 
had a different evaluation of Soviet nuclear deterrent capability 
and who maintained that priority should be given to economic 
and scientific development as the basis tor China ' s  long-term 
national defense position, di sagreed. They believed that military 
expenditures and manpower should be saved in order to lay down a 
( 54) . Ibid. ,P.44. 
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strong technical and economic foundatioL for the national 
defense . People ' s  Daily said on February 15,  1955 thata  
Our socialist construction work calls for enormous 
sources of runds and large numbers of talents. Those 
funds and talents cannot be obtained from others and 
must be • • •  fostered by ourselved • • •  I t  i s  not necessary 
in peacetime for our country to 1J1aintain a large 
standing army because a country with powerful reser­
ves can rapidly call them up to re �1st the enemy at 
the time of invasion • • •  I t  i s  possible for our coun­
try to reduce the standing army gradually to the 
necessary size in order to save enormous resources 
and manpower tor use 1n sociali st and peaceful cons­
truction work. 55 
or course , the d1fterence 1n interests between the professional 
military leaders and party men had other aspects,  and the debate 
was related to the i ssues of the atomic bomb and nuclear war. A 
study of the domestic debate between Peking ' s  leaders clearly 
reveal the fact that ,  1n the late 1950 ' s ,  some Chinese mili tary 
leaders were quite d1ssat1sfied with their role in policy-making, 
and , consequently, they tried to gain control within the framewo�k 
of national defense by emphasizing the destructiveness of nuclear 
. 
weapons and their implications for China ' s  nuclear strategy. 
c .  October, 1964 to Presents Balance of Nuclear Deterrent and 
�egotiation with the United State s .  
In the second half of 1960s, three major events emerged that 
seemed to affect China ' s  strategya the American escalation of 
of war in Indochina , the growing Sino-soviet ri ft, and the Chinese 
( 55) . People ' s  Da1lz Ed1tor1al on the Dratt conacr1pt1on Law, 
Februar1 15,  1955. 
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nuclear detonations. 
From Peking ' s  perspective, American strategic doctrine went 
through three distinct phases in the 1960 ' s .  The first phase 
the Chinese refer to as that of " flexible response . .. Under this 
strategy .the American government sought to prevent Communist 
China ' s  expansion and Communist revolution in Southeast Asia 
by building up its military power in this area . Wi th the failure 
of this effort in the eyes of the Chinese, American strategy 
turned to the second innovation, that of "counter-insurgency , "  
and finally evolved into. the third stage--the stage of "escala-
56 
tion . "  The rapid , sharp reaction of the United States in JUJ.y 
1964 to the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the bombing of North 
Vietnam had shown that the United States could be probably pro-
voked into reprisal s .  In any event, uncertainty about American 
intentions thus played an important role 1n the Chinese new 
strategic thought .  
A �  the samel time , the escalation of war in Indochina , espe­
cially in South Vietnam, parallelled the rapid deterioration of 
Sino-soviet relations to the point where the Chinese oould no . . 
longer rely on Soviet nuclear deterrent and proteotion. Following 
the armed conflict which .broke out on the Ussuri River at Chenpao 
,_ 
( 56 ) .  Morton H .  Halperin, "Chinese Attitudes toward the Use and 
Control ot Nuclear Weapons, "  1n Tang Tsou,ed. ,China 1n cr11 1, 
Volume 2 ,  ( The Un1vers1ty · ot. Ch1oago Press, 1970), 
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island (Damansky island in Hussian Press) on March 2 ,  1969, the 
Chinese began to fear that either the United States or , more 
likely, the Soviet Union m1gh� decide to destroy the embryonic 
Chinese nuclear capability. Th1s apprehension led the Chinese 
to act very cautiously in the period following the1r nuclear 
detonation and to accompany the development of nuclear capa-
b111 ty with a series ot statements stre�sing China ' s  reasonable­
ness• that China would never be the first to use nuclear weapons, 
and that China strongly support the complete prohibition of nuclear 
weapons. Fear of a pre-emptive nuclear attack not only forced the 
Chinese leaders to consider new options and strategie s ,  to 
reduce China ' s  i solation and vulnerability, to explore new oppor­
tuni ties for improvement of mutual relations with the United 
State s ,  but also increased the Chinese need of a nuclear deterrent 
against the superpowers .  
In evaluating the evolution of China ' s  nuclear strategy and 
her attitude toward nuclear weapons,  one may find China ' s  strategy 
and her predispositions to "calculate"--how one is to advance or 
retreat depending on the objective conditions . Yet, there _ are 
some military prinolples affecting the formation and evolution of 
China ' s  strategy in her leader ' s  view ot war and revolution. 
Basically, the Chinese principles ot war are round mainly 1n 
�.iao Tse-tung • e  mil1tarT thought. It• epec1t1o contribution to the 
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Chinese strategic doctrine are widely known , because the top 
military leaders� of present-day China have been . trained in Mao' s  
thought and are experienced in its successful application. 
Alioe Langley Hsieh summarizes Mao Tse-tung • s major military 
principles as followsa 
1 ) .  Rejection of the conception of quick decisive wars, 
based on purely military considerations, in favor 
of a view as the tatallty of political, economic ,  
psychological, and military factors. 
2 ) .  Emphasis on the conception of strategic withdrawal, 
avoidance of decisive battle s ,  and even temporaty 
a.be.ndonment of territory ln the early stages of the 
war,  1n the interest of eventual victory. 
J ) .  Belief in the initiation of the strategic offensive 
only when the balance of total strength i s  in the 
Communist ' s favor and thier victory certain. 
4) . Subordination of the strictly military viewpoint of 
the professional soldier to the political-military 
objective of the revolution, of the army to the 
Party, of weapons to men , of short-term success to 
long-term . 57 
In short, we may conclude China ' s  miLitary doctrine as followsa 
-· The EmPh981e on Flex1b111 tY 
The development of Communist China ' s  strategy has been character- · 
lzed b.Y tactical opportunism and adaptability, Mao Tse-tung evolved 
( 57 ) . Alice Langley Hsieh , CORUllunist C,1na'• Nuclear Strategy 
(New Jer1171 Prentic�-Hall , 1962 ,PP.1)-14. 
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a strategy of maximum ambiguity which originally applied to 
guerrilla warfare put also reflects his strategic thought in 
general. lie .expresses the principle of this strategy in a six­
teenth basic formula • "Enemy advance,  we retreat1 enemy halts,  
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we harass a enemy tires,  we attacke enemy retreats, we pursue . "  
On his essays " Protracted War" and ••strategic Problems of China• s 
Revolutionary War" written in the 19JOs, Mao ·summarized the 
correct military line in three propositions which he considered 
the prerequisttes for victory" 
l ) . To fight resolutely a decisive engagement in every 
campaign or battle when victory i s  certain. 
2 ) .  To avoid a decisive engagement in very campaign 
when victory i s  uncertain. 
J ) . To avoid absolutely a strategic decisive engagement 
which stakes the destiny of the nation. 
Practically , Mao was aware of the inferiority and vulnerability 
of the Chinese nuclear capability and the importance of pursuing 
only limited objectives in relation to capability. In Mao ' s  
viewpoint, " people who direct a war cannot strive for victories 
beyond the limit they can and must strive for victories through 
59 
their conscious activities . "  
Realizing this, then, 1n the field of arms control , the Chinese 
are likely to accept an international .agreement 1n order to 
(58). Mao Tse-tung ,Selected Work1 (l�ew Yorke International Publisher, 
1955) ,Volume 1 ,  P . 212. 
( 59) . lbid . ,P .242 . 
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( a )  to prevent disadvantageous esoalation1 ( b) to seek formal 
recognition of gains already achieved 1 ( c )  to mobilize public 
60 
op1niona and (d)  to win support for the future . 
The emphai s  on flexibility suggests two important a ssumptions 
about the Chinese behavior in internatbnal politics. First, 
Communist China ' s  leaders can be induced to compromise if they 
can be conv1nc.ed that the existing balance of pol1 tical and m1li-
tary forces make this necessary or desirable . Second , any com-
promise Peking accepts must generally be regarded as tactical 
movement rather· than as the abandonment of any ot its long-term 
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aims. 
War . is a-.Continuat1on of Polit1cs 
What is permanent in the Chinese theory is the insistence upon 
the subordination of purely military considerations to ideolo-
g1oal and political considerations. In Mao ' s  view, war 1 s  not 
simply " the continuance of politics by other means ,"  but is itself 
a form of� polit1c s .  Mao ' s theory of war is derived from that of 
Lenin on the relative importance of political factors. To Lenin, 
"War is part ot the whole . The whole is politics • • •  Appearances 
( 60 ) . Tang Tsou, Morton Halperin, "Mao Tse-tung' s  Revolutionary 
Strategy and Peking ' s International Behavior, "  American 
Political Science Review,Volume IIX,No � l ,  PP. 80-99 . 
( 61 ) . A .  Doak Barnett, "The Roots. ot Mao' s  Strategy, "  1n Devere 
E.Pentony , ed . ,ChinaaThe Emers1pg Red G1ant (Sanfranciscoa 
Chandler Publishing Company , 1962 ) ,p.97.  
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are not reality. Wars are most political when they seem most 
62 
military ."  
While by no means minimizing the importance of military 
force -- "political power grows out of the gun , "  Mao notes 
that the decisive factor 1n war can only be of a political 
nature, and that the Communist party should command the gun. 
Mao ' s  concern with winning a war through emphasis on poll-
t1cal forces enfables one to identify two additional Chinese 
approaches to victory. �1rst, the quantity and quality of 
military forces depend directly on the political morale ot 
the people. Thus , in his famous article -- "Long L1ve the 
Victory of People ' s  War" -- Lin Piao wrotea 
The essence of Comrade Mao Tse-tung ' s  theory of 
army building is that in building a people ' s  army 
prominence must be given to politics ,  i . e . ,  the 
army must first and foremost be built on a poli ­
tical basi s .  Politics ls  the commander , politics 
is  the soul of everything. Political work 1s the 
lifeline of our army. True , a people ' s  army must 
pay attention to the constant improvement of its 
weapons and equipment and its mili tary technique , 
but it relies mainly on politics,  on the prole­
tariat revolutionary consciousness and courage of 
the commanders and fighters, on the support and 
backing of the masses.6J 
( 62 ) .  Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy 
(�ew Yorka w . w .  Norton & Company , Inc .  1969), P .64. 
( 6J) . Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of Pe�ple ' s  War , •  1n 
Vera Simore, ed . ,  China in Revolution, History, Documents 
and Analysis (New Yorke Fawcett Publ1oat1ons, Inc . , 1968) , 
P .  482 .  
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Second , political mobilization i s  the reality primary con­
cern in war against imperialist countries having military super­
iority. If the entire people i s  mobilized the enemy will suffer, 
then conditions will be right for making up the deficiencies in 
the field of armament .  
Fighting War by Proxy 
While emphasizing the importance of ideology and political 
forces in Peking ' s  military strategy, i t  wbuld be a mistake to 
underestimate the role of nuclear deterrence 1n China ' s  nuclear 
stra�egy. 
At present, Peking ' s  deisre for a nuclear deterrent or a 
second-striking capability is based on the reality that any war 
·1nvolving China might bring unacceptable destruction to the 
Chinese mainland . But , according to the Chinese, this risk can 
be reduced i f  a 
1 ) .  the Chinese can fight war by proxy--which i s  being done 
in Indochina--in contrast to the use of Chinese troops , 
as in the Korean War. 
2 ) .  the prospective enemy ( the United States or the soviet 
Union) ·can be prevented from resorting to forms of 
warfare in which he enjoys a distinct superiority. 
J ) . the prospective enemy can be precluded from adopting 
other torma ot warfare against China that are more 
effective. , 
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4 ) .  the world opinion can be mobilized against American 
"war mongering" and in favor of an international 
agreement on total destruc tion of nuclear weapons 
"no-first use" of these weapons. 
5) . the Chinese can acquire the power of retaliation as 
a deterrent to the United States or the Soviet U�ion.64 
Further, Mao ' s  theory of People ' s  war--the establi shment of 
rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement of the 
cities from the countryside--is of outstanding importance to 
the Chinese military strategy. 
Taking the entire globe , if North American and Wes­
tern Europe can be called " the cities of the world , "  
then Asia , Africa and Latin America consti tue " the 
rural areas of the world , "  • • •  In a- sense, the con-. 
temporary world revolution also presents a pic ture 
of the encirclement of cities by the rural ares.65 
Theoretically , the Chinese have ado pted what seems to be a 
contradictory position on the question of people ' s  war. On the 
one hand , they argue that i t  is not actually necessary for 
China to help fight or even give material aid to foreign revo-
lut1onary struggles, because revolution in each oppressed countr7 
is made by the people of that country, not by Chinese. When 
Lin Piao specified the main elements of the people ' s  war, he 
particularly included a commitment to self-relian�e as a ma jor 
factor a 
In order to make a revo1ution and to fight a people ' s  
war, i t  l s  imperative to adhere to the policy of 
( 64) . Yuan-L1 Wu, "Peking and the Uni ted State s , "  Modern Age 
Volume 12 , No.4, 1968, Published under· the auspices or 
the foundation tor Foreign Affairs, Inc . 
( 65) . L1n Piao, "Long "LtTe the f1otor7 ot People ' s. War , "cited . ,P .486 • 
.. 
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self-reliance,  rely on the strength of the masses 
in one ' s  own country and prepare to carry on the 
ffght independently even wheh all material aid 
from outside is cut orr.66 
On the other hand , however,  the Chinese argue that the socialist 
countries should regard it as their international duty to support 
the revolutionary struggles in Afria, Asia , and Latin America . 
In fact,  i t  has not been Peking ' s  policy to commit Chinese troops 
to support wars outside China ' s  border, unless China ' s  national 
security and integrity are · dra stically threatened . In Mao ' s  
mind, Chinese present nuclear strategy i s  just one of the appli­
ca t1ons or people ' s  war theory. Under no circumstance should 
the Chinese conduct wars 1n such a way as t.o risk direct confronta-
tion with the United States or the Soviet Union. 
Despi te the Enemy StrategicallYI 
take Full Account of Him Tactically 
At the heart of the Chinese military strategy i s  the prin­
ciple , --"despite the eneD17 strategically , take full account of 
him tact1call7" 1 
To despite the enemy strategically means to per­
ceive that the class enemy, viewed in 1ts essence 
and in the long run, 1 s  bound to perish 1n the 
end , no matter how powerful he may be for a time • 
• • •  To take full account of the enemy tact1call7 
( 66) Ibid. ,P.48). 
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means that with regard to any given part of the 
whole, and in each specific struggle, i t  is nece­
ssary to take the enemy seriously, to be prudent, 
to pay careful attention to the art or struggle 
and to adopt forms or struggle suited to different 
times, places, and conditions in order to isolate 
and wipe out the enemy step by step .67 
I t  is in this light that we should examine such statements 
as " The United States is a paper tiger" or "Man will triumph 
over weapons." The statement that the United States is paper 
tiger--a doctrine which i s  probably the most graphic example ot 
the Chinese principle or despising the enemy strategically but 
taking full account of �im tactically--means that in the long 
run the United States can be defeated by proper strategy , it 
does not mean that nuclear weapons cannot destroy China. In the 
same way, the statement that man will triumph over weapons means 
that in the long run what will determine the political orien­
tation or countries is the view of men and not the nature of the 
weapons systemt i t  does not mean that if a nuclear weapon and 
a man are in the same plac e ,  the nuclear weapon cannot explode 
68 
and kill the man. 
As mentioned earlier, many factors in the international system 
and i ssues in Chinese domestic affairs have contributed to the 
formation of the Chinese nuclear strategy .• Turning more specifically 
(67) . Shao T1eh-ohen, "Revoluti onary Dialectics and How to Appraise 
Imperialism ," Pekin& Review ,�o . 2 ,  196).PP . 14-15 .  
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to strategicall7 issues, the mili tar7 presence of the United 
States in Southeast Asia and the Sino-Soviet border conflict 
to the north present the specters of encirclement and war on 
the Chinese multiple fronts. Peking ' s  leaders appear to realize 
that as long as the United States and the Soviet Union vir­
tually possess nuclear superiority, Chinese strategic goals 
and foreign policy objectives will be ver7 difficult,  if not 
impossible, to realize. At present, i t  seems that Communist 
China may adopt certain different strategies to enhance Chinese 
security. One can divide these strategies into three categories• 
l )  
From the point of view of Peking, Soviet invasion or American 
nuclear attack is theoretically diminished by the fact that 
" the Chinese claim they will never launch war of expansion or 
wars a s  a substitute for revolutionary struggle by the peoples 
69 
of other countries . "  Such proposals for arms control or di s-
armament seek to convince the superpowers of China ' s  peaceful 
intention so that they will not consider taking any action against 
the development of . nuclear weapons by the Chinese, such as a 
pre-emptive nuclear attack on Chinese nuclear facilities. 
(69 ) . J .D .  Simonds , China's world • The Porelgp Pollcz or a peve­io,1ys S�'' (Camberrae Auetral1a National Un1Terslt7 Preas, 
19 0 ,P.  • 
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2 )  Continued develpment of Ch1!l{l' s nucl�ar weapons . 
The purpose would be to attain a second-strike capab111ty to 
inflict poli tically unacceptable damage on the United State s .  
The same purpose would apply vis-a-vis the nuclear threat from 
the Soviet Union. 
J) Negotiation with the United States and improvement or 
diplomatic relations with non-Communist countries.  
The purpose i s  to attempt an U . S . -Soviet-Ch1na triangle in 
world affairs. The point is that 1f the Soviet Union can be 
isolated trom the mass revolutionary peoples ot the world, 
effective Soviet nuclear pressure on China will lessen. 
Chapter Four 
CHINA ' S  ATTITUDE TOWARD ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 
As discussed in chapter three ,  Communist China could enhance 
her national security by adopting arms control and diarmament .__ 
proposals . At present, China ' s  poistion on arms control and 
disarmament is one of the most compl icated issues in the inter­
national ��stem. The basic difficu1ty of inducing China to 
participate in arms control efforts comes from the character of 
arms control arrangements . In the Chin
.
ese strategic view, an 
actual formal arms control and disarmament arrangement , as 
dlstlnct from a more in1t1at1ve , must promote not only the 
security of the world , but also their military power and poli­
tical influence.  
This chapter deals with primarily with the. development of 
attitudes and policies in China concerning the nuclear test 
and the spread of nucler weapons. Discussion and analysis in 
this chapter is divided into two parts • ( 1 )  China ' s  position 
on nuc.J.ear proliferation and • ( 2 )  China ' s  attitude toward arms 
control. 
China's Position on Nuclear Prol1ferat1on I 
In recent 7eara the Chinese have made aeTeral declaratory statments, 
which at fact Talue haTe major implications tor the Chinese stand 
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on the question of nuclear proliferation. In constructing the 
Chinese view on this question, i t  i s  of considerable impor­
tance to distinguish between their attitudes in· ther period 
following their nuclear detonation on October 16, 1964, and 
those elaborated in the pre�etonation period. 
During the early postwar· period, prior to their first nuclear 
test on October 16, 1964, the Chinese did not have anytbihg 
much to say on the question of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear 
proliferation meant to them· initially Soviet development of 
nuclear weapons, and later their development by China, and 
possibly other socialist countries in order to break the nu­
cler monopoly of the Uni ted States. This basic view was made 
in the statement in the People ' s  Daily in 1951 which declared 
that•  
Only the fact that other countrie s ,  in the first 
place the Soviet Union, possess the atomic weapon 
can bring America to believe that there i s  not 
the slightest advantage in atomic militarism, thereby 
bringing about the possibility of prohibiting the 
atomic weapon. 70 
Beginning in 1956-57, the soviet Union became gradually con­
cerned with the possibility that West Germany would ultimately 
�cquire a nuclear capability.  The Soviet Union therefore apparently 
wi thdrew i ts aid to the Chinese nucler program in 1959 and urged 
( 70 ) . People' a Daily,October 7 ,  19Sl, 1n surve1 of the China 
Mainland Preae (Hong Konga u .. s .  C onsulate ) .�o . 190 , P . 2 .  
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China not to become a nuclear power. At that time the Chinese 
in general continued to support the soviet stand on the question 
of nuclear proliferation, but apparently began to see the 
non-prol�feration more as reflecting an attempt by the Soviet  
Union and the United States to prevent China from getting nu­
clear weapons . What the Chinese believed and what in fact happened 
during thi s period. were explicitly expressed in the Chinese 
, public statement of August 15,  196Ja 
It is not only at present that the Soviet leaders 
have began to collude with u . s .  imperialism and 
attempt to manacle China . As far back as June 20 , 
1959 , when there was not yet the slightest sign of 
a treaty on stopping nuclear tests,  the Soviet 
Government unilate�ally tore up the agreement on 
new technology for national defense concluded between 
China and the Soviet Union on October 15,  1957 , and 
refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic 
bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture . 
The Chinese Government sent three memoranda to the 
S.oviet Goverment on September J ,  1962 , October 20,  
1962 , and June 6 ,  .196J , stating that i t  was a ma­
tter for the Soviet Government whether it commi tted 
i tself to the United States to refrain from trans­
ferring nuclear weapons and technical information 
concerning their manufacture to China s but that 
the Chinese Government hoped the Soviet Government 
would not infringe on China ' s  sovereign rights and 
act for China in assum1n� an obligation to refrain 
from manufacturing nuclear weapons • • •  
The whole corse of events amounts to thi s a  first the 
Soviet Government tried to subdue China and curry 
favor with u . s .  imperialism by discontinuing assis­
tance in an attempt to induce China to abandon 1ts 
solemn stand . Failing in all this ,  i t  has brazenly 
ganged up with the imperialist bandits in exerting 
pressur• on Ch1na . ?l 
( 71 } - "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government--A 
Comment on the Soviet Government •  a S ta·tement of August 15, 
l96J1  in William E. Griffith, The .Sino-soviet R1ft (Cam­
bridgeaMIT Press,  l964) ,PP . J5-J52 . 
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During this period , many high-ranking Chinese leaders. b�gan 
to indicate that they considered nuclear proliferation to be 
desirable . For example , in 1958 General Liu Ya-lou, Commander­
in-chief of the Chinese Communis t  Air Forces,  and in 1961 
Chen Yi , Vice-premier and Foreign Minister, both said that 
the spread of nuclear weapons to as many c ountries as possible 
was desirab1e, for i t  wo'i1ld increase the prospects of complete 
72 
nuclear disarmament . 
In 1963 China moved into open opposition to the Soviet position 
on the question of nuclear proliferation, particularly on the 
partial test ban treaty. The Chinese maintained that the more 
socialist countries which have nuclear weapons , the better. 
With regard to preventing nuclear proliferation,  
the Chinese Government has always maintained the 
arguments of the u . s .  imperialists must not echoed , 
but that a class analysis must be made .  Whether 
or not nuclear weapons help peace depends on who 
possesses them. I t  1s  deterimental to peace if they 
are in the hands of imperialist countrie s 1  i t  helps 
peace if they are in the socialist countries. I t  · 
must not be said indiscriminately that the danger 
of nuclear war increase along with the increase in 
the number of nuclear powers.7) 
A second Chinese argument concerned the correlation between 
the statistics ot nuclear spread and the danger of nuclear war. 
In the Chinese view, the danger of nuclear war becomes less when 
( 72 ) .  People ' s  Daily, 22 December, 1961. 
( 7J ) . William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, P . )47. 
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the number of nuclear powers increases from one to two. In 
l96J, Communist China claimed • "Did the danger of nuclear war 
become greater or less when the number of nuclear powers increased 
74 
from one to . two? We say i t  becomes less, not greater . "  Hence 
the Chinese have never shown any indication of being worried 
by the statistical argument about the dangers of nuclear proli­
feration, which i s  extremely common in the West.  If one examines 
the Chinese behavior, one finds that Albert Wohlstetter• s pro­
position that each nuclear power will be opposed to the deve-
lopment of nuclear weapons by the next Nth power does not . charac-
75 
terize the Chinese position at all. 
The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 196J, sponsored by the Uni ted 
States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, should therefore be , 
in the point of view of Communist China , rej ec ted because i t  
was designed t o  " bind all socialist countries except the Soviet 
Union and all countries subject to aggression, without hindering 
the United States from prol1ferat1on i ts nuclear weapons among its 
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allies and countries under its control . "  
In 1964, immediately after thier first nuclear test on October 
16 • -'�the Chinese entered a period in which their polimics tended 
to be extremely cautious in an effort to present a picture of 
( 74) . Ib1d . ,P . J47 . 
( 75) . ·Albert Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharinga .NATO and the N-1 Countr7" 
in H .N .  Rosecrance,ed . ,  The Dispersal of �uclear Weapons (New 
Yorka Columbia University Press , 1964),P . 189. 
( 76) . lb1d . , P . J4J. 
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China as a reasonable country which could be trusted with 
?? 
nuclear weapons . "  In fact,  there were two notable changes 
1n China � s  policy toward nuclear proliferation after the 1964 
test. First, China stopped explicitly advocating nuclear pro­
liferation. But i t  still , in general, reasserted that the po-
ssession of nuclear weapons by socialist  countries was desirabl e .  
Second , China started to denounce a total nuclear test ban. 
Before thier first nuclear test , the Chinese , although they 
opposed the Partial Test Ban Treaty , still advocated a total 
nuclear test ban. After their first nuclear test ,  the Chinese 
argued that because the United States had already conduc ted 
hundreads of nuclear test and possessed a huge stockpile of 
nuclear weapons , a total nuclear test ban would not affect the 
balance of nuclear c�pab1lity between the socialist countries 
and the imperialist countries , .but, on the contrary , would make 
78 
Chinese further development of nuclear weapons impossibl e .  
Therefore , the Chinese began t o  regard a total nuclear test ban 
as a means of preventing China ' s  nuclear development . 
As for the important questlon of whether China itself might 
transfer actual nuclear weapons or nuclear technology to other 
socialist countries,  the Chinese posi tion has been very ambiguous. 
(??) . Morton H ,  Halperin, China and Nuclear Prol1ferat1on ( Ch1cagoa 
The University of Chicago, 1966), P . 14. 
\ , ,  ./· 
( ?8 ) .  Leo Yueh-yun Liu, China 1ls Nuclear Power 1n World Politics 
(New Yorka Tapl1nger Publishing C ompa117, 19?2), P . )l .  
- 68 -
When Chen Y1 was questioned on thi s point, 1n September 1965, 
he sa1d• 
There are two aspects to the question of nuclear 
proliferation. As for the peaceful use of atomic 
energy and the building of atomic reactors, China 
has already been approached by several countries,  
and China i s  ready to render them assistance s as 
for the request for China ' s  help in the manufac- 79 
ture of atom bombs , this question is not realistic . 
Actually this statement may not be strictly true s there are 
some indications that in 1964 or in 1965 China may have made 
80 
some promises of nuclear assistance to Indonesia. In fact ,  
i t  seems fair to conclude that China �as sought to give the 
impression that she will not transfer nuclear weapons to other 
states but has attempted to avoid giving a pledge to this effect 
that could . be interpreted as anti-socialist. 
Some recent trends 1n nuclear proliferation has pushed China 
into a position of pivotal importance .  In the foreseeable future , 
China ' s  growing capability will increase the problems for some 
Asian countries,  particularly for India and Japan , 1n maintaining 
their own nuclear security. Even if the United States and the 
Soviet Union play down China ' s  nuclear power or assure mili tary 
assistance in case of a Chinese nuclear attack, this would not 
( 79) . "China Is Determined to Make All Necessary sacrifices for the 
Defeat of u . s .  Imperiali sm , "  Peking Revie1,No.41 ,1965,P.14 .  
( 80 ) . Harold c. Hinton, Ch1na'
T 
Turbylent Quest(New York• The 
Macmill1an Compa117, 19?0 ,P.18?. · 
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resolve the .difficulties of those non-nuclear countries which . 
81 
feel menaced by China In the case of India , for example , 
any superpower' s  guarantee to defend India against Chinese 
nuclear threat would probably be undatisfactory to India . Under 
what conditions would India trust a superpower' s assurance and 
forgo nuclear program? Masson Willrich has summarized India ' s  
position a 
Would a guarantee agaist nuclear blackmail help 
India decide to forgo the chance of developing 
a nuclear capability? Since Communist China began 
sitting off nuclear blast$ , India has raised its 
price for making an unequivocal renunciations it  
indicates that it wants considerably more than a 
simple guarantee . An undertaking " through the United 
�ations" to safeguard the security of nonnuclear 
nations is only part of i ts demand .• Also included 
are an agreement by the nuclear powers not to 
transfer nuclear weapons to other powers ,  a com­
prehensive nuclear test ban and a freeze on fur­
ther production Of nuclear weapons and delivery 
systems, coupled with substantial reductions in 
existing inventorie s . 82 
On the other hand , the Chinese in fact may see very real 
advantages in an Indian or Japanese decision to develop nuclear 
weapons. At least, the development by India of an independent 
nuclear capability would produce pressure� driving both of the 
United States and the Soviet Union out of Inidia and making their 
cooperation in India more difficult. Similarly , a Japanese decision 
( 81 ) . Mason Willrich , Non-Proliferation Treat11 Framework for 
huclear Arms Control (V1rg1n1a a  The Michie Company, 1969) ,P,16), 
( 82 ) ,  Mason Willrich, "Guarantees to Non-Nuclear Nations , "  
Foreign Affairs, July, 1966 ,P.689. 
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to develop nuclear weapons would serve to accelerate the 
deterioration of Japanese-American relations. 
Besides these 1mp11cations, China ' s  consistent support of nu-
clear proliferation also has some impacts on the superpowers 
relations and their strategic thought. According to s . c .  Yuter' s  
analysi s ,  both the United States and the soviet Union are cur­
rently faced with three similar and difficult alternatives• ( 1 )  
accepting a nuclear-proliferating world , 1n which a confronta­
tion with the Soviet Union ( or the United States) over a nuclear 
West Germany could easily lead to general nuclear war s  ( 2 )  attemp­
ting, with at least the tacit support of the Soviet Union ( or 
the United States) ,  to prevent further nuclear proliferation 
by freezing or destroying the Chinese nuclear program, which 
might lead to a nuclear exchange in the Far Easts  or ( J )  with­
drawing in isolation behind a heavy anti-ballistic missile system, 
leaving the rest of the world to be dominated by the Soviet Union 
8J 
( or the United States) and China . 
I f  Yuter• s analysis is correct ,  how far the United States and 
the soviet Union will go in actually preventing nuclear prol1-
I 
feration depbnde upon how quickly China ' s  nuclear capability 
increases in size and also on whether or not the Chinese continue 
with th1er policy of advocating nuclear prol1ferat1on. 
(SJ) . s .c .  Yuter , "Preventlng .Nuclear Prol1terat1on . Through the 
Legal Control ot China ' s  Bomb, "  Orbit ,. Volume XII ,No.4,  
1969, P.1020, 
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China ' s  Attitude toward Arms Control 
Prior to the 1963 Moscow negotiation on the nuclear test 
ban, the Chinese had generally supported Soviet proposals and 
positions on arms control and disarmament .  On August Jl , 1958 . 
a Chinese statement declared that the United States and the 
Great Britain should suspend all nuclear tests because " the 
experts at Geneva have found detection possible . "  The Chinese 
added that an "agreement must be negotiated for a permanent 
ban on the testing of all atomic and hydrogen weapons by all 
84 
powers . "  The Chinese also supported Khruschev• s assertion that 
an atom-free zone must be created in the Far East and the entire 
Pacific basin area. On April 18,  1959 . the Chinese explicitly 
advocated an· atom-free zone throughout the whole of East Asia 
and the Pacific region. Throughout 1958 there were some indi-
cators regarding the Chinese view toward a nuclear-free zone in 
Asia . The president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences stated 
that he would welcome a conference to ( a )  establish de-atomized 
zones 1  ( b) stop flights with nuclear bomb loads 1  ( c )  stop nuclear 
testings and ( d )  ban the manufact1re , stockpillng, and use of 
85 
such weapons. 
( 84) . Morton H .  Halperin, "Sino-Sovie t  Nuclear Relatlons , 1957-
1960 ' "  in Sino-soviet Relations and Arms Control , ( Cam­
bridge a The M . I .T.  Presa,  1967),PP . lJ4-lJ9. 
( 85) . Walter c. Clemens, Jr • •  The Arma Race and Sino-soviet 
Relations, P . 258 . 
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In any event ,  the year 1959 wa.s a turning point in Sino-
Soviet relations. Following Soviet refusal to give China a 
sample of an atomic bomb in 1959 and Soviet withdrawal of 
technicians from China in 1960, the Chinese began to cirti­
cize the Soviet Union' s pursuit of arms control and di sarma­
ment. In January , 1960, the Chinese declared that "any inter-
national agreement concerning disarmament, wi thout formal 
participation of the People ; s  Republic of China and the sig-
nature of its delegare , cannot have any binding force on her. "  
This view was expressed at. a time when the Soviet Union began 
to negotiate with the United States on the nuclear test ban. 
86 
In February, 1960, the Chinese observer · at Warsaw Pact C onference 
stated that " the struggles forgeneral disarmmament is a long-
term complicated stDuggle between us ( the Communi st countries) 
81 
and imperialism . "  I n  1961,an editorial. in Hung-ch' i ,  the 
" 
theoretical fortnight of the Central C ommi ttee of the Chinese 
Communist Party, insisted that " to safeguard peace , i t  is nece­
ssary to wage an active struggle against imperialism, the creator 
of war. " 88 
In September an� October, 1962 , and again in JUne , 196J, the 
Chinese sent three notes to the Soviet Union expressing the hope 
( 86 ) .SCMP ( Survey ot the Chinese Mainland Presa) , 2185,  January 
21 , 960, P.4.  
( 87) . SCNP , 2194, February 11 , 1960 , · P.44. 
( 88) . Hung-oh' i ,  No.25,  December 16 , 1961, Quoted from V1dya Prakash 
Dutt, Ch1na and )he World (New Iork a International Publishers, 
1964) ,P .120. 
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that the Soviet Union would not accede to any agreement that 
would infringe on China ' s  sovereign rights and act for China in 
assuming an obligation to refrain from developing nuclear wea-
pons. The Chinese also argued that only complete and total nu­
clear disarmament i s  realistic and a nuclear test ban treaty can 
only be dangerous to world peace .  Thus the first Chinese reac­
tion to the nuclear test ban treaty was a statement advocating 
the complete and total prohibition and destruction of nuclear 
weapons. In its statement of July Jl , 196) , the Chinese Govern­
ment made clear its positiona 
( 1 )  All countries in the world , both nuclear and non-nuclear, 
solemnly declare that they will prohibit and destroy 
nuclear weapons completely, thoroughly, totally and 
resolutely. 
(2) All countries shall di smantle all military bases,  
including nuclear· base s ,  on foreign soil, and with­
draw from abroad all nuclear weapons and their means 
of delivery. 
( J )  Establis1ng a nuclear-free zone of the Asian and Pacific 
region, including the United States,  the Soviet Union, 
China and Japan ; a nuclear-weapon-free zone of C entral 
Europe s a nuclear-weapon-free zone of Africa a and a 
nuclear-weapon-free zone of Latin America . 
(4)  An international conf�rence of the government neads of 
all the countries of . the world shall be convened to 
discuss the question of the complete and thorough des­
truction of nuclear weapons .89 
These proposals were rej ec ted by the West. From the Western 
... 
V1ewpo1n t ,  �·nuclear weapona were ae much a part of the aecur1 ty 
( 89) . Translantion of the statement in Pek1ns Review, No , )l ,  
August 2 ,  l96J.  
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system in the Far East as they were in Europe . "  Therefore , " the 
establishment of a nuclear free zone would upset the military 
be.lance in the Far East in the same manner as it would in Europe . "  
The strategic consideration, and past Chinese behavior ot suppor­
ting Communist revolution, made it highly unlikely. that the 
Western countries would accept any zonal program for arms control. 
The Chinese proposals undoubtedly were designed for propaganda 
purposes-to counteract the adverse effects �: f their rejection 
of the nuclear test ban treaty--and were not designed for prac-
t1onl operation. 
In 1964., after her first nuclear tes t ,  C ommuni st China w1 th­
drew her long standing support for the establishment of a nu­
clear-free zone . In addition to r�iterating her appeal for a . 
summit conference and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, 
Communist China made a unilateral commitment never to use nu-
clear weapons unless subjected to nuclear attack. She was no 
longer interested in any proposal which . might increase res1s­
tence to continuing nuclear test and thereby adversely affect 
her nuclear 4evelopment. Instead, emphasis was shifted from nu­
clear•fre zone to the no-first-use pr1no1ple 1 
Many countries are at prsent keenly interested in 
the establshment ot nuolear-rree zones.  However, 
to really tree the -nuclear-tree zones trom the 
( 90) . William P .  Ansberry, Arms Control and D1sal'!Qlment1 Success 
or Failure? ( Berkeley, Cal1fo�nia • MrCutrhan Publishing 
Corporation, 1969) , P . ao; 
90 
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threat of nuclear war i t  i s  necessary in the first 
place for the nuclear powers to und�rtake not to 
use nuclear weapons. Ohterwi se , the establi shment 
of nuclear-free zones would be 1mpoas1ble . 91 
In the Chinese Viewpoint, a no-first-use agreement would 
serve as the first step to the ultimate goal of complete pro­
hibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons • 
This concrete proposal by the Chinese government 
that an agreement be reached first on not using 
nuclear weapons i s  practical , fair and reasonable,  
easily feasible and involves no question of  con­
trol . If all the countries concerned are willing 
to make this commitment, then Xhe danger of nuclear 
war will be immediately reduced. An this wouldm.ean 
a big 1n1t1al step toward $ the ultimate goal of 
complete prohibition and thorough destruction of 
nuclear weapons . After that,  1t would be possible 
to discuss the question of the halting of all 
kinds of nuclear tests , the prohibition of the 
export, import, proli feration, manufacture , stock� 
p1le and destruction of nuclear weapcns . 92 
In a second letter to all heads of government in 1964, Chou 
En-lai also maintained that, as the first step,  " the summit 
conference should reach an agreement to the effect that the 
nuclear powers and those countries wh1ch may soon become nuclear 
93 
powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons . "  Following their 
first nuclear test, the Chinese consistently called tor such a 
( 91 ) . "New Starting Point for Striving tor Complete Ban on Nuclear 
Weapons , "  ed1tor1al in Jen-min Jih-pao, November 22 , 1964. 
( 92 ) . Peking Review ,  No.44, October JO , 1964. 
( 9J ) .  "Premier Chou Cables Government Head• of the World' "  Pek1ns 
Bevlew,No.4), October 2),  1�64. 
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no-first-use agreement on may occasions. For example ,  following 
the third nuclear test,  Chou En-lai revealed that earlier he 
had proposed at Warsaw to negotiate wiht the United States 
about a no-first-use agreement. The United States, however, 
rejected the Chinese proposal by arguing that id did not repre-
sent "a constructive step toward the paramount problem of con-
94 
trolled disarmament. "  
In the foreseeable future , there are reasons to believe that 
Communist China ' s  no-first-use proposal will never be accepted 
by the United States.  First, the Chinese are fully aware of the 
destructiveness or nuclear weapons, but they also have a real-
istic appreciation of the limitations of nuclear weapons. Wea­
pons of such mass destruction as hydrogen bombs make nonsense 
of the traditional limited aims ot most conventional wars between 
nations. Since the Chinese possess a huge conventional armed 
forces, a u .s. commitment not to use nuclear weapons would in­
crease the effect! vene.ss ot Chinese vonventional armed forces 
in the event of local conflicts . Secondly, the United States 
currently has many treaty obligations and commitments in Asia . 
A u .s .  no-first-use ple�ge would seriously reduce their credib1-
b111ty to American allies and thus affect the defense system of 
tboae countries.  Those Asian countries may become less confident 
( 94) . Arms C ontrol Arrangements for the Far East (Cal1forn1a s  The 
Hoover Instituttion on War, Revolution and Peac e ,  Stanford 
Un1vera1t7, 1967) ,P,48 ,  
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of American willingness to use nuclear weapons in their defense 
and less willing to accept the use of nuclear weapons in a 
si tuation in wh1ch a nuclear war may be reciprocal. 
So far,  Communist Ch1na ' s  position on arms control and dis­
armament rema1ns unchanged , though many tangible and intangible 
factors may affect China ' s  attitudes toward various arms con-
trol measures in the next decade.  One still can summarize China ' s  
current position on arms control as follows • 
l f  Communist China regards arms control essentially as one 
of the means which can enhance her national security 
and her political influence in world affairs. 
2 )  Communist China regards "no-first-use" principle as the 
the first step toward the complete prohibition and thor­
ough destruction of nuclear weapons.  In the coming years , 
as her ·nuclear capability grows , Communist China will 
not be willing to accept a nuclear-free zone proposal . 
J )  C ommunist China regards current arms control and disarma­
ment measures as an American-soviet collaboration aimed 
at the prevention of Chinese nuclear development.There­
fore , actions must be taken by the Chinese to break such 
collaborations as the Nuclear Partial Test Ban Treaty and 
the Nuclear Non•proliferation Treaty. 
4)  Communi st �hina regards nuclear weapons as thecenter of 
arms control efforts and gives no explicit consideration 
to control of conventional armed forces, such a s  limita­
tion of the number of conventioal armed forces . 
5)  In the coming years, if the United States or the Soviet 
Union fails to make a no-first-use agreement , Communi st 
China may regard pr·oh1 bl ti on of an ABM system and removal 
of troops from foreign countries as additional require­
ments for a complete prohibition and total destruction of 
nuclear weapons . 
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'fAbLK III  
A View of Atti tude of  Communi st China Toward Western-sponsored 
and Possible Chinese-initiated Arms Control Measures (1973). 
The following table represents what would be the actual atti­
tudes of the People ' s  Republic of China under three major nu-
clear. balance arrangements for specific arms control and dis­
armament measures .  The Judgments are comparatively hypothetical 
in the cases of the Type B and Type C nuclear balance , which 
have never existed in post-1949 C ommunist China .  
Arms 
Control 
Measures 
1 .  
Types of 
Nuclear 
Balance 
Type A 
U .S .  and USSR 
First Strike 
Capability 
Aga.1nst China 
Type B 
Chinese Second 
Strike Capabi-
11 ty Against 
U .S.  and USSR 
Type C 
Chinese First 
Strike Cap�bi­
li ty Against 
U . S.  and USSR 
Nuclear Partial. Test Would not enter Would enter 
Ban 
Would enter 
2 .  
Nuclear Total Test 
Ban 
J .  
N onprol1 ferat1on of 
huclear Weapons and 
Nonsissem1nat1on ·of 
�uclear 'l'echnology 
Would not enter Would not enter Woul4 enter 
Would not enter Would not entet Would enter 
( C ont . )  
•rypes of 
t.uclear 
Balance Arms 
Control_ 
Proposals 
4 .  
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Type A 
U . S .  and USSR 
First Strike 
Capabi lity 
Against China 
Type B 
Chinese Sec ond 
Strike Capabi .;. ·  
l i ty Against 
U . S .  and USSR 
Type C 
Chinese P1rst 
Strike Capabi ­
l i ty Against 
U . S .  and USSR 
Control of Conven- Would not enter Would not enter Would not ente1 
tional Forces 
5 .  
Establishment of 
l�uclear-free zone Would not enter Would not ente1 Would not ent9 · 
6 .  
Prohibition of or 
Restriction on ABM Would enter 
System 
7 • . 
� o-first-use Agree· Would enter 
mont 
8 .  
Removal of •rroops 
and l�uclear Weaporn Would enter 
from Foreign Coun-
tries 
Would enter Would ·enter 
Would enter Would enter 
• 
Would enter Would enter 
I 
·����������-+----------------�t-----------------+--------��----+:• 9 .  J C omplete Prohibi-tion and Total des· Would enter Would enter Would not ·ente 
truction of Nuclea1 I 
WP.:ations • 
C�pter F1ve 
CHINA' S NUCLEAfi CAPABILITY AND THE AMEHICAN ABM SYS'fEM 
In the foreseeable future , as Chinese nuclear capability 
grows , a new type of nuclear balance w111 appear in Asia which 
may have some complicated impacts on American nuclear strategy. 
On the strategic level , the United States w111 be confronted 
with the realization that in any Asian m1litary conflic t it 
will be up against a nuclear power capable of wrecking great 
nuclear destruction in Asia and at least poli �1cally unacceptable 
damage in the United States.  Theis fact would appear to provide 
some pressure against greater American intervention in Asian mili­
tary crises and cause some major shifts w1th1n the framework of 
American nuclear strategy. There has been much debate whether a 
Chinese-oriented ABM system would change thi s  situation. 
There is not doubt that uncerta1.nty is a characteristic fact 
of the present weapons systems that are incorporated into mili-
tary forces. The accurate evaluation of a Ch1nese-or1ented ABM 
system is beset by many doubts and uncertaintie s ,  for the entire 
question of the Smer1can ABM system against China rests on assump­
tions regarding the nuclear development and the aggressiveness of 
China . Although these uncertainties and asumpt1ons make it d1ff1-
cult to predict with confidence the effectiveness of the ABM system, 
they also mean that discussion and analysis or the p0sa1ble effect• 
or ABM deplouaent are or. part1ularl7 value. 
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The Impac t of Chinese ICBMs on American Nuclear S trategy 
Over the last �wenty-five years , the nuclear strategic postures 
of the United States have been developed almost entirely with a 
view to deterring the Soviet Union. When Secretary of Defense 
Robert s. McNamara announced in 1967 the American deci sion to 
deploy a thin Chinese-oriented ABM system, he introduced an 
entirely new element into the dialogue of American defense and 
deterrence .  For the first time, he ci ted Chia ' s  emerging nuclear 
capability a s  a potential threat to the United State s .  In looking 
a t  the question of a Chinese-oriented A.BM system , 1 t  1 s  relevant 
to c9ns1der, among other things, what kind of ICBM capability i a  
China likely to have , and what are the impacts of China ' s  ICBM 
capability on the United S ta tes defense system. 
On the question of China ' s  nuclear capability, Secre tary McNamara 
estimated in 1967 that there can be an opera tional Chinese ICBM a s  
early as 197J . On March 20,  1969, however, Deputy Secretary of 
Defense David Packard downgraded McNamara ' s  prospect by saying 
tha t " the Chinese threat i s  not much further along today than i t  
95 
was three years ago . "  I n  1970 the Chinese nuclear capability 
continued . to be limited to airplanes wi th a limited range . They 
are working on ICBMs but, according to the· Uni ted States estimation, 
( 95) . 
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96 
they will not have a significant capability unt11 the 1980 ' s .  
Current estimates suggest that the Chinese will probably have 
accumulated ten to twenty-five operational ICBMs by the middle 
97 
or late 1070 ' s .  The u . s .  Department of Defense believes tha t 
in the event of a full-scale clash, a Chinese force of twenty­
f1 ve ICBMs could inflict up to eleven million deaths upon the 
United States, and a Chinese force or · se¥eNty-f1ve could kill 
. 98 
up to twenty-five million. 
The Chinese recognize that American "assured destruction" forces 
can inflict immense damage on . China and therfore act as a potent 
instrument of deterrence and persuasion. However, 1 t  also seems 
to the Chinese that the United States i s  unlikely to escalate 
to the use of these "assured destruction" forces. C onversely, 
once the Chinese possess ICBM s ,  the ability of the United States 
to �ontinue to deter the Soviet Union will depend upon an assured 
destruction force that can survive a nuclear exchange with China 
as well as a first strike by the Soviet Union. From the point of 
view of Chi na ,  this reverse effe'ct may compel the United States 
to take avoiding action to prevent a nuclear clash with China. 
Consequently , there i s  every reason to believe that the Chinese 
( 96 ) .  Morton H, Halperin, Defense Strate ies for the Severt es 
( Bostona Little , Brown and C ompany, 1971 ,P.  9 ,  
( 97) . A .  Doak ·Barnett, A New u.s, Poticx toward China (Washington• 
The Brookings Institution,1971 ,P.104, 
( 98 ) ,  Harry G, Gelber, "The Impact of Chinese ICBMs on Strategic 
Deterrence , "  Qrb1s, Volume XIII , N o . 2 ,  1969 , P . 410. 
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seeking onl7 for a moderate ICBM capability which would deter 
the Uni ted States ·from launching a pre-emptive attack against 
China . 
Given this background, the Chinese could theoretically hope 
for three kind·s of damage-inflicting capability against the 
United State s .  The first would be the ability to destroy or 
use up enough American weaponry , including ICBM s ,  to leave the 
United States with too few deliverabl� warheads to maintain 
assured destruction force against the Soviet Union.The second 
possibility would be a Chinese nuclear capability which can 
threaten the destruction of vital pa�ts of . the American command 
and control machinery. Besides these two kinds of capabil i ty ,  the 
third kind could be the most cruc1a l a  that of casualties and . 
99 
the associated intang1bale of morale. 
If it is accepted that the United States cannot seek a solution 
of this problem through inaction , five alternatives are available 
to cope with the nuclear threat from China• 
1 )  Alternative A--A search for the improvement of mutual re- . 
lati9ns and a general political understanding with China. 
2 )  Alternative B--The announcement of a u . s .  first-s trike 
strategy designed to convince the Chinese that China 
would be unable to launch an ICBM attack on the United 
States before her ICBMs were hit by a pre-emtive attack. 
J )  Alternative c --Ach1evement of a bilateral agreement designed 
to drastically reduce strategic torces and mill tar7 budgets· 
( 99 ) . Ib1d . ,Pi.411-412 . 
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4) Alternative D--A combination of a drastic increase in 
strategic offensive forces and a development of an 
ABM system. 
5) Alternative E--A full deployment of an Chinese�oriented 
A.BM system in order to secure a drastic reduction in 
China ' s  nuclear threat .  This would add enough defense to 
u.s. strateg1c · offensive forces to protect the American 
people from China ' s  ICBMs attack. 
For the long term, alternative A would be the only policy 
capable of solving the basic difficulty and attacing support 
within the . . United Sta tea .  However, Communist China • s hostility 
toward the United States i s  confirmed by a nwnber of other matters , 
ranging from u . s .  support for the Nationalist regime (Republic 
of China) on �a1wan to the Amer1oan-sov1et collaboration 1n the 
field of arms control. An improvement of mutual relaions can 
be reached only through a mutual accomodation of differences a 
both powers must face up to decisions that will bring fundamental 
changes in their policies.  Although C ommunist China ' s  hostility 
toward the United States may soften in the future , genuine progress 
toward the improvement of mutual relations between China and the 
United States will certainly take a long time. 
From the
.
point of view of China , an American first-strike strategy 
will extend in time the American ability to threaten China with 
sufficient n�clear weapons . Therefore , alternative B may tend to 
reconfirm Chinese assumptions about imcompatible hostility and, 
hence , slow down China ' s  reconciliation with the u·n1 ted States. 
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Alternative c ,  mutual force reduction, would pro tect the 
United States against the ultimate threat of China . But this 
alternative can be carried out only by an agreement that includes 
a nuclear test ban, which the Chinese have rejected. 
Alternative D ,  if adopted by the United States, would also 
protect the United States against an irrational Chinese ICBM 
attack, but would not save money. Suppose for discussion purposes 
that halting the introduc tion . of new offensive weapons and multiple 
warheads would release at least between $5 billion and 10 billion 
a year for American strategic defense. Conversely, such ·a sum 
ill buy a Chinese-oriented ABM system capable of intercepting 
China ' s  incoming ICBMs and cutting American civilian deaths. 
There remains the possibility of alternative E .  Most importantly ,  
this should mean an ABM system designed to hold damage and casual­
ties from a Chinese attack to a very low figure. Proposals for 
such a system, called S entiane l ,  were advanced by Secretary of 
Defense McNamara in 1967. That system has been modified by the 
Nixon Administration in 1969. According to the U . S .  government, 
the new ABM system, named Safeguard , would give the same degree 
of area cover against a Chinese threat through the 1970 ' a . as 
Sentinel would have done . 
jhe Development of an American ABM System 
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A missile system l s  designed to protect a target system 
from ICBM attack by intercepting the reentry vehicles of 
an incoming enemy ICBM or a short range SLBM ( Bubmar1ne-launched 
ballistic missile ) .  
Serious concern· in the United S ta te s  about anti�ballistic 
missiles stretched back over the last decade and half to 1954. 
In that year the United States began to shift the emphasis in 
its strategic weapons program from manned bombers to ballistic 
missile s .  The first re search work for a defense against missiles 
began in 1956 with the N1ke-Zeus ballistic missile defense system. 
By 1962 , the N ike-Zeus system had successfully intercepted its 
first ICBM on a test firing from the Pacific test range at 
Kwa Jalein Atoll. Further tests conduc ted on ICBMs fired from 
Vanderberg Air Force Base in California demostrated the feasibilit7 
of the technique of interception. But President Ei senhower vetoed 
the deployment of the system in 1959 , and this · declsion was re­
affirmed by President Kenned7 in 1962 . 
One of the principal objections to the N i ke-Zeus system came 
from the strategic argument of the United States Air Force . C er­
tainly, emphasis on offensive capability has been the dominant 
theme of the United States Air Force in the post-world War II 
period . From the point ot View ot the u.s. A1r Pore e ,  the heart 
or American nuol•ar deterrent etrate87 ha• been the ab1llty to 
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de stroy an aggressor ' s  cities and population. The refore , 1f 
the only purpose of the American nuclear forces is to deter 
wars , then any change by the Soviet Union in the de terrent 
equation can be met by increasing the American offensive deterrent 
forces. An ABM system, �hen , i s  viewed as awaste of money which 
could spent on offensive forces to maintain a nuclear deterrent. 
The second diffuculty of the Nike-Zeus system was i t s  great 
cost. For fi scal 1960, beginning in July 1 ,  1959, the u .  s .  
Army recommanded �l . J  billion for the N ike-Zeus program. This 
figure included �JOO million for research and devel opment and 
i700 million for tooling and some Nike-Zeus base s .  In the end, 
this fj_gure was reduced by u . s .  Congress to #JOO million. Since 
the Army had no additional fund s ,  the Ei senhower Administration 
would have to raise the defense budge t .  Since this would upset 
the budge t ,  the Eisenhower Administration decided not to deploy 
the N ike-Zeus system. 
Moreove r ,  the most s1gn1fioant limitation with regard to the 
N ike-Zeus system was that i ts radar system was too slow (abou� 
one-fourth the speed of an ICBM warhead ) to cope with the problem 
of missile attack. In his 1963 testimony before the House Armed 
Services C ommittee , Secretary of Defense McNamara explained the 
reasons for not producing the N ike-Zeus aystem1 
We still have a great deal to learn about re-entry 
phenomena and teohnlquea tor d 1 ecrlm1natlng between 
warhead• ana deoo7e, We also haYe a gre� � deal to 
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learn about the effects of a nuclear de tormt1on 
from one of our intercepting missiles on other 
elements of the decisive s·ystem. On balance , 
therefore , we believe that i t  is prema ture a t  
this time to commi t ourselves to the produc tion 
of any system and certainly not to an interim 
system with admi ttedly limited capabilities.  
Instead , we propose to proc eed with the grea test 
urgency in the development of the Nike-X system, 
retaining the option to move ahead with ac tual 
production and deploument of such system, if the 
capabi lities of the . system and the circumstances 
should warrant such a decision a t  some later 
time. 100 
l'lc.Namara • s pronounciation marked the birth of the N ike-X system. 
This system involved an improved radar system and a mix of missiles 
designed to overcome the insufficiencies of the Nike-Zeus system. 
The mechanically steerable radars used 1n N ike-Zeus system were 
replaced by several types of phased-array radars 1n Nike-Z system. 
In addition, the Nike-X system also included an "area defense" 
concept by incorporating. the Spartan missile . 
The Nike-X system was not ,  however, approved for deployment • 
. 
Daniel J .  Fink, former Deputy Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering for Strategic and Space system, has noted tha t a  
The reasons were severalfold , but a t  least included 
the following s I t  was a very expensive terminal de­
fense system which for a given amount of moeny could 
provide protection to some number of c 1 t 1 e s ,  but 
leaving many totally unprotected , and i t  suffered 
the flaw of any terminal defense sys tem--namely, that 
every piece contributes to the cost but the enemy 
( 100) . Benson D .  Adams , Ballistic M i ssile Defense H�ew York a 
American Elsevier Publsih1ng Company , Inc . ,1971) , P . 6 ) .  
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can choose where to attack and only a small 
part of the system can be brought to bear to 
counter wuoh an attack. 101·. 
Despite the fact that the Nike-X system was not approved for 
deployment, research and development work continued . In 1964, 
China conducted her first nuclear test, and the United States 
saw a threat that migot be neutralized with greater confidence 
than the nuclear threat from the Soviet Union. Not long there-
after, the range of the American ABM system was greatly expanded . 
On September 18,  196?, the J ohnson Administration announced the 
u . s .  decision to deploy a thin Chinese-roiented system designed 
primarily to defend the United States population against a 
potential Chinese nuclear attack in the mid-1970s. 
Because the Sentinel system was . a Chinese-oriented ABM system, 
i t  was obviqusly vulnerable to the nuclear attack. In 1969 , the 
Nixon Administration took account of the rapid rate of Soviet 
ICBM deployment a�d then proposed the Safeguard system. The 
purpose of the Safeguard system was defined by President Nixon as 
('1) · protection of American land-based retaliatory forces against 
a direct attack by the Soviet Uniona ( 2 )  defense of the American 
people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China 
i s  likely to be able to mount with in the decade s ( J )  protection 
( 101) . William Schneider, Jr. , "Missile Defense System• Past, 
Present and Future , "  in John J .  Holst & William Schne1der,Jr. , 
eds . , Wh ABM? Polle Issues in the M ssile Defense Con­
troversy New York• Pergamon Press, 19 9 ,P . 7 .  
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102 
against the possibility or accidental attacks from any source.  
The primary mission of the Safeguard system i s  different from 
the original Sentinel mission. I t  was designed primarily to 
protect u . s .  Minuteman ICBMs and Strategic Air Command bases . 
The discussion of the Chinese-oriented ABM system reached to 
a new ·stage in 19?2. On May 26, 1972 , President Nixon and Leonid 
Brezhenev signed what w111 prove to be the most important arms 
control agreements negotiated between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. The .Moscow ABM and arms limitation agreements pro­
vided for ( 1 )  a proposed treaty l.1m1t 1ng the development of de-
tense against ballistic m�ssiles,  called the Treaty on ABMs , 
and 2 )  a proposed " Interim Agreement" limiting certain kinds 
of strategic offensive weapons, namely ICBMs and SLBMs. 
Th� basic provi sions of .the Moscow ABM treaty were as followsa 
first,  the United State·s and the Soviet Union undertake not to 
• 
deploy ABM systems for a defense of their territories and not 
to provide · a base for such a defense . Second , the United States 
and the Soviet Union undertake not to develop, test or deploy 
ABM systems or components which are sea-based, ai�-based, spa�e­
based or mobile-based • 
From the viewpoint of military consideration ,  nothing in either 
Moscow agreement provided a substi tute means for satisfying .the 
( 102 ) .  Charles M .  Herzfeld, "Missile Defense • Can I t  Work?" in · 
J ohn J .  Holst & William Schnelder, Jr.  , eds . ,  Why ABM? 
Polle Issues in the Missile Defense Controvers ,(New Yorka 
Pergamon Press , 19 9 , P . 21 .  
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threefold objectives of the Safeguard system. But these two 
agreements actually were great step� toward the stability of 
international system and contributed to the halting of nuclear 
arms race.  They didn' t introduce an essent1al change is the 
defense system of the United States and the Soviet Union. They 
merely recognized pol1tical realties. The United States had to 
make a choice if i t  indeed tried to prevent the possibility of 
nuclear attack from any source without spending a minumum of 
an additional $100 billion for defense in 1972-1976. Furthermore, 
the United States had to sign these two agreements 1f it sought 
to avoid build1ng any ABM system. whic h oan be viewed by China 
as an anti-Chinese posture . 
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TA.i:il.E IV 
Summary· of Arguments For and Against the 
Deplolgllent of a Chinese-oriented ABM System 
l-lany pol1t1cal , m111tary and technical arguments have been 
advanced both for and against the development of a Chinese-oriented 
ABM system 1n the United States .  To examine the current state of 
the ABM 1�sue, and appraise 1 ts effectiveness,  i t  i s  necessary 
to simplify those arguments in terms of political and technical 
Viewpoints. Based on the statements of protagonists and antago-
nists of the ABM system, the following table represents a summary 
of arguments for and against the deployment of a Chinese-oriented 
system. 
Pro-ABN 
I t  discourages nuclear proli­
feration by sidening the gap 
between the superpowers. 
It can maintain the cred1bi-
li ty of the American deterrent. 
I t  should be deployed because 
the . soviet Union has developed 
one . · 
I t  reduce the possibility of 
smaller powers using nuclear 
blackmail against non-nuclear 
countries 
Anti-ABM 
There 1 s  no way to test it  
except under actual enemy 
attack. 
It will intensify rather than 
restrain the arms race ,  wor­
sening instead of 1mprov1ng 
u .s . -sov1et relat1onsh1ps . 
I t  coat too much . 
I t  threaten arms control and 
disarmament measures .  
- 9J -
(Cont. ) 
Pro-ABM 
I t  might produce a "Winning" 
position. 
It would reduce greatly the 
damage which the Chinese 
could do with ICBMs attack. 
I t  will enable s  the United 
States ·to add a s  a concurrent 
benefit further defense of u . s .  
1'11nuteman sites against Soviet 
attack. 
It will provide dconom1c benefits 
in terms of employment, large in­
vestment, etc . 
Anlt-ABM 
I t  would ac tually decrease 
American security and capacity 
to conduct an intelligent and 
rational foreign policy. 
It would force the Soviet Union 
to react by increasing the size 
of its strategic offensive forces. 
I t  will provoke the· Soviet Union 
into finding a counter to i t  
or launching a pre-emptive attack. 
I t  ls destabilizing, since it 
upset the deterrent balance and 
does not allow for a stabiliza­
tion of strategic weapons. 
Its radars are vulnerable to 
attack. 
It would prevent China from 
participating in arms control 
negotiations . 
Souroes a  C .F.  Barnaby & A .  Boserup , eds . , Implications of Ant1-
balli st1c Missile System (New York1 The Humani ties .Press ,  
1969),PP . 26-35. William B.  Bader, 'l'he United States and 
Spread of Nuclear Weapons ( New Yorka Western Publishing 
Company, inc. 1969),P.119. Robert s .  McNamara , The Essence 
of Security (New Yorke Harper & Row, Publishers , 1968) , P , 165. 
Benson D. Adams , ,Ballistic M1 ss11e Defense (New Yorke American 
Elsevier Publishing Company,Inc.1969),P.lOl. 
CONCLUSION 
What can be said in summary about the complex problems of 
China ' s  emergence as a nuclear power? First of all , the mili­
tary danger Crom China should not be overlooked. At present, 
the Chinese do not have the resources or , apparently , the 
inclination to undertake major military actions beyond their 
borders--partioularly in the face of A�erican nuclear power and 
the presence on their northern continental borders of a Russina 
nuclear threat .  On the contrary , the great danger results from 
the weakness and mi sunderstanding of the superpower ' s  policy 
tow�rd China . I t  is e ssential to deter possible Chinese nuclear 
attack and check the expansion of Chinese influence ,  but the 
superpowers cannot rely solely on a policy of military retali­
ation to cope with the Chinese problem. 
A possible solution of the problems posed by the Chinese nuclear 
forces can be achieved through some sort of political arrangement. 
China is a vast political entity forced unwillingly in the last 
century to participate in a world of coloni�lism and imperialism . 
with which she had no ·fundamental sympathy. The admi ssion of 
China to the United Nations, the beginning of a· detente with the 
Uni ted States ,  and the fact of being a nuclear power should have 
gone some way towards eradicating the feeling of frustration 
which, from the heg1nning, has been the main dynamic of Chinese 
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international behavior. The United States and the Soviet Union 
must attempt to draw China into more active and responsi ble 
particiaption in world affairs, rather than trying to exclude 
i t  from the international community. 
Looking to the future , it is certainly possible that China ' s  
nuclear strategy , and her specific foreign policies ,  could undergo 
significant changes. As President Kennedy felt that " the passage 
of time , the change of leadership isolation from world contacts, 
internal requirements and failure of aggression would all persuade 
10) 
the Chinese on the mainland to amend their attitude,"  i t  can 
be assumed that new leadersh1p and new policies w1ll emerge in 
�hina ' s  positions regarding many international i ssues. 
However , fundamental changes in China ' s  atti tudes toward nuclear 
weapons and arms control issues will not be easy for China to 
make because of China ' s  weakness · in relation to the United States 
and the soviet Union. The Chinese will aspire to an equal and , 
if possible, superior status to the superpowers 1n terms of nu­
clear and conventional weapons. This stand • which i s  characteristic 
of Communist China ' s  past nuclear policy .and strategy , will pre-
elude any acquiescence by China in control of nuclear weapons. 
Moreover, even if China can be induced to par�1cipate in arms 
control efforts,  there will be doubts raised as to the reliability 
(lOJ ) . Kenneth Young, tiegot1ating W�th the Chinese Communists 
(�ew Xork1 McGraw Hill , 1968 ,PP.2)9-240 . 
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of some of the promises which China undertakes to perform via 
international agreements. Communi st China does not subscribe 
so much to the sancitity of treaties but rather is 1ncl1ned to 
examine the power relationships of the signatories in determining 
1 f  the agreement should be kept. Therefore , in the foreseeable 
future , C ommunist China will not accede to an international 
agreement that would permit her actual and potenttl.al enemies to 
retain their nuclear superiority while inh1b1t1ng her from im­
proving nuclear capability .  However , if 1n· .the future China ever 
concludes that particular arms control arrangements will better 
serve her vital interests , the Chinese w111 be as w1111ng to 
accept such e�rangements aa would any other nation that has reached 
the same conclusion. 
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